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Civil Rights in a Desegregating America
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos†
The law largely has overlooked one of the most important sociological developments of the last half century: a sharp decline in residential segregation. In 1970, 80
percent of African Americans would have had to switch neighborhoods for blacks to
be spread evenly across the typical metropolitan area. By 2010, this proportion was
down to 55 percent and was continuing to fall. Bringing this striking trend (and its
causes) to the attention of the legal literature is my initial aim in this Article.
My more fundamental goal, though, is to explore what desegregation means
for the three bodies of civil rights law—housing discrimination, vote dilution, and
school segregation—to which it is tied most closely. I first explain how all three bodies historically relied on segregation. Its perpetuation by housing practices led to
disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act. It meant that minority
groups were “geographically compact,” as required by the Voting Rights Act. And it
contributed to the racially separated schools from which segregative intent was inferred in Brown and its progeny.
I then argue that all of these doctrines are disrupted by desegregation. Fair
Housing Act plaintiffs cannot win certain disparate impact suits if residential patterns are stably integrated. Nor can claimants under the Voting Rights Act satisfy
the statute’s geographic compactness requirement. And desegregating homes usually
result in desegregating schools, which in turn make illicit intent difficult to infer.
Lastly, I offer some tentative thoughts about civil rights law in a less racially
separated America. I am most optimistic about the Fair Housing Act. “Integrated
and balanced living patterns” are among the statute’s aspirations, and it increasingly is achieving them. Conversely, I am most pessimistic about the Voting Rights
Act. One of its objectives is minority representation, which is threatened when minorities are politically distinctive but spatially dispersed. And a mixed verdict seems
in order for school desegregation law. Rising residential integration eventually
should produce rising school integration. But it has not done so yet, and even when
it does, this improvement may not reach schools’ other racial imbalances.
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INTRODUCTION
Two generations ago, in the wake of rioting that scarred dozens of American cities, the Kerner Commission issued its landmark report on urban unrest.1 The report warned darkly of high
and rising racial segregation. “To continue present policies,” it intoned, “is to make permanent the division of our country into two
societies: one, largely Negro and poor, located in the central cities;
the other, predominantly white and affluent, located in the suburbs.”2 One generation ago, a pair of prominent sociologists, Professors Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, penned another
highly influential work on racial separation. American Apartheid3

1
See generally Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
(1968) (“Kerner Commission Report”). See also generally John Charles Boger, Race and
the American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect—an Introduction, 71 NC L Rev
1289 (1993) (commenting at length on the report’s significance).
2
Kerner Commission Report at 10 (cited in note 1). See also id at 1 (“This is our
basic conclusion: Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”).
3
See generally Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Harvard 1993). See also Patrick Sharkey,
Stuck in Place: Urban Neighborhoods and the End of Progress toward Racial Equality 25
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traced the ways in which public policy produced what the authors
termed “hypersegregation,”4 and argued that it was “the key structural factor[ ] responsible for the perpetuation of black poverty.”5
In the legal academy, the conventional wisdom is that little
has changed since the Kerner Report and American Apartheid.
The drafter of the preeminent treatise on housing discrimination
law asserts that “the United States continues to be characterized
by high levels of racial segregation.”6 Another housing expert
comments that “the failure to stem racial residential segregation
has helped it to deepen, widen, and become seemingly intractable.”7 A recent amicus brief signed by dozens of housing scholars
declares that “[r]esidential racial segregation across the United
States remains pervasive.”8 Summing up the literature, Professor
Michael Maly observes, “The volume of research on the extent of
segregation . . . makes it difficult to believe that integrated neighborhoods even exist.”9
But the conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, a great deal
has changed over the last two generations—so much that sociologists are now churning out works with titles like The Waning of

(Chicago 2013) (calling American Apartheid one of two “major work[s] on urban poverty”
published in the last several decades).
4
Massey and Denton, American Apartheid at 17–78 (cited in note 3). See also Douglas
S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and
Hispanic Segregation along Five Dimensions, 26 Demography 373, 373–74 (1989).
5
Massey and Denton, American Apartheid at 9 (cited in note 3).
6
Robert G. Schwemm, Housing Discrimination: Law and Litigation § 2:1 at 2-2
(Thomson Reuters 2014).
7
Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 Cardozo L Rev 967,
970 (2012).
8
Brief of Housing Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc, Civil Action
No 13-1371, *4 (US filed Dec 23, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 7405732). For
other examples of legal scholars characterizing segregation levels as high and stable, see
Rigel C. Oliveri, Beyond Disparate Impact: How the Fair Housing Movement Can Move
On, 54 Washburn L J 625, 642 (2015) (noting “the persistent and pervasive nature of residential racial segregation across the nation”); Daria Roithmayr, Locked in Segregation,
12 Va J Soc Pol & L 197, 198 (2004) (pointing out “[t]he persistence of residential segregation” and observing that it appears “to be a [ ] stable feature of the American socioeconomic landscape”); Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game,
100 Colum L Rev 1965, 1979 (2000) (commenting on the “prevalence of segregation as a
social phenomenon”).
9
Michael T. Maly, Beyond Segregation: Multiracial and Multiethnic Neighborhoods
in the United States 2 (Temple 2005).
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American Apartheid?10 and The End of the Segregated Century.11
Take the most common measure of segregation, which represents
the share of group members who would have to switch neighborhoods for the group to be spread evenly across a metropolitan
area. This metric peaked at about 80 percent for African Americans in 1970. But it has since sunk to roughly 55 percent, the
same value, more or less, as in 1910.12 Or consider another popular index of segregation, which captures the makeup of the community of the typical group member. In 1970, the average black
lived in a neighborhood that was about 60 percent more black
than her metropolitan area as a whole. But this figure has since
dropped to roughly 30 percent, or approximately the same level
as in 1920.13 Almost all of the rise in segregation that took place
during the twentieth century thus has been reversed.
What accounts for this impressive (and underappreciated)
trend? One factor is the decline in housing discrimination by both
public and private parties. Overtly segregative governmental policies are now rare,14 and according to a series of studies by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), discriminatory acts by real estate professionals have fallen in frequency
as well.15 Another explanation is the increased willingness of
whites to live in integrated areas. In 1976, for instance, only 50
percent of Detroit-area whites said they would consider moving
to a community that was one-fifth black.16 By 2004, this proportion had surged to 79 percent.17 And still another cause is the
10 See generally Reynolds Farley, The Waning of American Apartheid?, 10 Contexts
36 (Summer 2011).
11 See generally Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century: Racial Separation in America’s Neighborhoods, 1890–2010 (Manhattan Institute,
Jan 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/5E85-NT99. For other optimistically titled works,
see generally William H. Frey, Diversity Explosion: How New Racial Demographics Are Remaking America (Brookings 2015); Maly, Beyond Segregation (cited in note 9); John Iceland,
Gregory Sharp, and Jeffrey M. Timberlake, Sun Belt Rising: Regional Population Change
and the Decline in Black Residential Segregation, 1970–2009, 50 Demography 97 (2013).
12 See Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *3–4 (cited in note 11).
13 See id.
14 See, for example, Jacob S. Rugh and Douglas S. Massey, Segregation in Post-Civil
Rights America: Stalled Integration or the End of the Segregated Century?, 11 Du Bois Rev
205, 206 (2014) (“Public policies . . . appear largely to have ended overt racial discrimination in real estate and lending markets.”).
15 See Margery Austin Turner, et al, Housing Discrimination against Racial and Ethnic Minorities 2012 *xxiii (HUD Office of Policy Development and Research, June 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Y8AL-673L (“Long-term trends in patterns of discrimination suggest that the attitudes and actions of rental and sales agents have changed over time.”).
16 See Farley, 10 Contexts at 40 (cited in note 10).
17 See id.
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spectacular population growth of nonblack minorities, in particular Hispanics and Asian Americans. These groups now seem to
serve as “buffers” that enable whites and blacks to live together
in durably diverse neighborhoods.18
My initial aim in this Article, then, is to bring to the legal
literature’s attention the recent sociological findings about the
shifts in, and sources of, segregation. It is time for the stylized
facts that have long guided thinking about these topics to be updated. My more fundamental goal, though, is to explore what the
decline in segregation means for the law itself. At least three bodies of civil rights doctrine—involving housing discrimination, vote
dilution, and school segregation—are closely connected to racial
groups’ residential patterns. For each of these areas, I show how
the existence of segregation historically has supported the imposition of liability and aggressive remedies. I then argue that desegregation is reshaping the legal landscape and making key doctrinal elements harder to establish. Lastly, I offer some tentative
thoughts about the role of civil rights law in a less racially separated America.
Start with housing discrimination, which is banned at the
federal level by the Fair Housing Act19 (FHA). The FHA is tied to
segregation in several ways. First, the Supreme Court has held
repeatedly that plaintiffs have statutory standing if they live in
areas that are segregated or in danger of becoming segregated.20
The deprivation of the “social and professional benefits of living
in an integrated society” is a cognizable injury.21 Second, segregated residential patterns are useful evidence in FHA cases
brought pursuant to a disparate treatment theory. They help to
demonstrate the discriminatory intent of, say, housing authorities that limit low-income projects to minority-heavy areas. And
third, as the Court recently confirmed,22 one type of disparate impact claim available under the FHA is that certain practices “have
18 See John R. Logan and Charles Zhang, Global Neighborhoods: New Pathways to
Diversity and Separation, 115 Am J Sociology 1069, 1070–72 (2010) (explaining the
“buffer” phenomenon and concluding that “stable diversity is possible . . . if black entry is
preceded by a substantial presence of both Hispanic and Asian residents”).
19 Pub L No 90-284, 82 Stat 81 (1968), codified as amended at 42 USC § 3601 et seq.
20 See Havens Realty Corp v Coleman, 455 US 363, 376–78 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91, 109–11, 114–15 (1979); Trafficante v Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 208–12 (1972).
21 Gladstone, 441 US at 111, 115.
22 See Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc, 135 S Ct 2507, 2522 (2015) (stating that the FHA targets practices “creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation”) (emphasis added).
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the effect of perpetuating housing segregation in a community.”23
Both actual segregation levels and the levels that would have
arisen but for the challenged practices are crucial to such a claim.
All of these aspects of FHA doctrine are destabilized by desegregation. For example, plaintiffs do not have standing (at least
on this basis) if they live in areas that are integrated and likely
to remain so. They do not suffer the harm of segregated living
recognized by the FHA. Similarly, it is more difficult to establish
discriminatory intent in the absence of segregated residential
patterns. Without them, plaintiffs cannot benefit from the presumption that parties intend the foreseeable consequences of
their actions.24 And segregative impact may not even be a viable
theory of liability in a stably integrated region. It founders on
both the lack of existing segregation and the improbability of demographic change.
Next take racial vote dilution, which refers to policies that
diminish minorities’ electoral influence without disenfranchising
them outright, and which is prohibited federally by the Voting
Rights Act25 (VRA). In a key decision construing the VRA’s core
provision, the Court held that in order to state a claim, minority
populations must be “geographically compact,”26 and there must
be racial polarization in voting.27 Geographic compactness is almost a synonym for geographic segregation. The criterion is satisfied only by minority groups that are densely concentrated in
discrete areas. Racial polarization is related to segregation as
well, only methodologically rather than substantively. It is easier
to estimate the share of each racial group that supports a given
candidate if there exist precincts occupied almost exclusively by
each group’s members. These “homogeneous precincts” make the
analysis more tractable.28
23

Schwemm, Housing Discrimination § 10:7 at 10-52 (cited in note 6).
See, for example, Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v Feeney, 442 US 256,
278 (1979) (reciting this common-law presumption). Of course, this presumption alone is
insufficient to establish discriminatory intent, at least under the Equal Protection Clause.
See id at 278–80.
25 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965), codified as amended at 52 USC § 10101 et
seq. See also 52 USC § 10301(b) (banning practices that result in minority members having “less opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their choice”).
26 Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 50 (1986).
27 See id at 51. Gingles’s second prong requires minority political cohesion, and its
third prong requires white bloc voting. See id. In combination, these two prongs amount
to a racial-polarization criterion.
28 See id at 52, 53 n 20 (quoting the district court as referring to “extreme case analysis” carried out by the plaintiffs’ expert as “standard in the literature”). See also D. James
24
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Again, desegregation unsettles the doctrine. If minority populations are residentially integrated, then they cannot comply
with the compactness requirement imposed by the Court, meaning that there cannot be liability under the VRA. If a jurisdiction
nevertheless encloses a dispersed minority group within a single
district, then the district probably violates the constitutional ban
on racial gerrymandering.29 Race is the only justification for this
kind of constituency, but it is not a permissible one. And even if a
sufficiently compact majority-minority district can be drawn in a
desegregated area, plaintiffs are unlikely to be able to show that
voting is racially polarized. Homogeneous precinct analysis
breaks down when most precincts are racially heterogeneous, and
even regressions become unreliable when two (or more) racial
groups coexist throughout a region.30
Last, consider school segregation, which the Court forbade in
perhaps the most celebrated decision in its history.31 School enrollments are linked to residential patterns because of the American norm of neighborhood schools. Children tend to attend
schools located near their homes, thus reproducing at the school
level the racial makeup of local housing. However, the correlation
between residential and school segregation is imperfect. The latter also is influenced by parents’ decisions to enroll their students
in private schools, as well as by an array of school district policies.
Some of these policies are integrative (and often adopted due to
court order): busing, magnet schools, attendance zone adjustment, and the like. Other policies, such as vouchers and charter
schools, usually are enacted for nonracial reasons.
Because school segregation is a function of residential segregation and other factors, its trajectory since Brown v Board of
Greiner, Ecological Inference in Voting Rights Act Disputes: Where Are We Now, and Where
Do We Want to Be?, 47 Jurimetrics 115, 155–57 (2007) (listing dozens of VRA cases employing homogeneous precinct analysis).
29 This ban originated in the landmark case of Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993),
which recognized the “analytically distinct claim” that a district was drawn predominantly
for racial reasons. Id at 652.
30 See generally D. James Greiner, Re-solidifying Racial Bloc Voting: Empirics and
Legal Doctrine in the Melting Pot, 86 Ind L J 447 (2011) (discussing difficulties caused by
desegregation for racial-polarization analysis).
31 See generally Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954). More
specifically, the Court forbade de jure but not de facto school segregation. See id at 487–
88, 495. I refer to school segregation as “de jure” or “intentional” when I wish to call attention to its constitutionality. When I refer to school segregation without any qualifiers, I
mean de facto segregation: schools’ actual level of racial separation. Consistent with this
usage, I treat “integration” and “desegregation” as synonymous, both referring to de facto
rather than de jure conditions.

STEPHANOPOULOS_ART_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

1336

The University of Chicago Law Review

9/20/2016 2:00 PM

[83:1329

Education of Topeka32 has not been a steady descent. Instead, it
plummeted in the late 1960s and 1970s, at a much faster rate
than residential segregation, as courts ordered far-reaching integrative policies in hundreds of school districts.33 But since the late
1980s, it has remained roughly constant.34 The continuing decline
in residential segregation has exerted a downward pressure on
school segregation, but this effect has been offset by the release of
many school districts from judicial supervision.35 At present,
thanks to the removal of most court-mandated remedies, the connection between residential and school segregation is the strongest it has been in decades.36 Going forward, this means that trends
in the two metrics should be similar.
Doctrinally, then, residential segregation plays a role in
school desegregation litigation to the (substantial) extent that it
determines school enrollments. At the liability stage, racially uneven enrollments caused by racially uneven residential patterns
support an inference of segregative intent on the part of the school
district. Uneven residential patterns also make it more likely that
policies like attendance zone demarcation and new school construction will have a segregative impact, from which an illicit motive can be inferred as well. After liability has been imposed,
courts presume that enrollment imbalances are “vestiges” of the
original constitutional violation that make it improper for judicial
supervision to be lifted.37 Since these imbalances often are the result of residential segregation, it often prevents school districts
from attaining unitary status.
32

347 US 483 (1954).
See, for example, John R. Logan and Deirdre Oakley, The Continuing Legacy of
the Brown Decision: Court Action and School Segregation, 1960-2000 *15 (Lewis Mumford
Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research, Jan 28, 2004), archived at
http://perma.cc/5N8N-2BGW (showing a decline in the dissimilarity index of the average
school district from 79.4 in 1968 to 45.4 in 1990).
34 See, for example, Sean F. Reardon and Ann Owens, 60 Years after Brown: Trends
and Consequences of School Segregation, 40 Ann Rev Sociology 199, 204 (2014) (“[T]he last
25 years have been characterized by largely stable patterns of sorting of students among
schools.”).
35 See, for example, Charles T. Clotfelter, Jacob L. Vigdor, and Helen F. Ladd, Federal Oversight, Local Control, and the Specter of “Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8
Am L & Econ Rev 347, 350 (2006) (noting that “were it not for judicial rulings of unitary
status, racial segregation across schools might have declined” due to “[t]he decline in residential segregation”).
36 See Erica Frankenberg, The Role of Residential Segregation in Contemporary
School Segregation, 45 Educ & Urban Society 548, 557–58 (2013) (showing an increase in
the correlation between residential and school segregation to 0.91 in 2010).
37 Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 US 1, 15–18 (1971). See
also, for example, Freeman v Pitts, 503 US 467, 505 (1992) (Scalia concurring) (observing
33
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Once again, desegregation complicates the picture. At the liability stage, it is more difficult for plaintiffs to establish segregative intent if school enrollments, like the residential patterns that
help drive them, are integrating. There still may be an improper
motive in this scenario, but it is harder to discern if it does not
manifest itself in racially skewed student bodies. Likewise, when
a district requests to be released from court oversight, its claim is
more likely to succeed if its schools are desegregating thanks to
the ongoing residential trend. School enrollment statistics are vital evidence in any unitary status proceeding, and the better they
look, the better the district’s odds of terminating the litigation.
So what might we conclude about the state of civil rights law
in an America in which racial and spatial divisions are (gradually)
mending? I would deliver a mixed verdict. On the one hand, some
of the evils the law has long fought are fading, which is cause for
celebration. One of the FHA’s aspirations, in particular, is the creation of “truly integrated and balanced living patterns,” as its
chief Senate sponsor put it.38 We certainly are not there yet, but
this goal’s achievement is no longer wholly fanciful. Similarly,
even though it is invidious intent that Brown and its progeny proscribe, the cases still envision a future “without a ‘white’ school
and a ‘Negro’ school, but just schools.”39 Progress toward school
integration has stalled since the late 1980s, but it is likely to resume now that residential patterns and school enrollments are so
tightly coupled.
On the other hand, segregation is not the only ill that civil
rights law tries to cure, and its improvement does not mean that
other problems have been solved. For instance, both the FHA and
the cases from Brown onward are deeply concerned about discrimination too—the adverse treatment of real estate customers
and schoolchildren because of their race, irrespective of the segregative consequences. True, discrimination is one of the most potent drivers of segregation. But discrimination also can occur in a
more integrated society, and the law needs to remain wary of it
even as segregation continues to decline.

that once a violation has been proved, “there arises a presumption, effectively irrebuttable
. . . that any current racial imbalance is the product of that violation”).
38 Trafficante, 409 US at 211, quoting 90th Cong, 2d Sess, in 114 Cong Rec 3422 (Feb
20, 1968) (“1968 Civil Rights Act Senate Debate”) (statement of Sen Mondale).
39 Green v County School Board of New Kent County, 391 US 430, 442 (1968).
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Even more worryingly, the VRA seeks to secure representation for minorities, but this aim is directly threatened by desegregation. To win districts in which they can elect their preferred
candidates, minorities need to prove geographic compactness and
voting polarization—both daunting tasks if they are residentially
integrated. Fortunately, these hurdles are the product of the
Court’s case law rather than the statute itself, and so could be
lifted without legislative intervention. The Court could drop the
compactness requirement that it conjured out of thin air. It could
allow nonelectoral evidence, survey results in particular, to be
used to establish polarization. And most promisingly, it could embrace remedies other than single-member districts, thus enabling
even dispersed minorities to be represented.
The Article unfolds as follows. First, in Part I, I discuss the
sociological literature on racial segregation. I cover definitions of
segregation, its trends for various racial groups, and the factors
that cause it. Then, in Parts II through IV, I analyze the implications of declining segregation for the three bodies of civil rights
law to which it is most relevant: the Fair Housing Act, the Voting
Rights Act, and school desegregation doctrine. For each area, I
show how it historically has relied on the existence of segregation,
how it is challenged by greater residential integration, and how
it might be rethought in a less racially separated environment.
One last point before beginning: While the lessening of blackwhite segregation is striking, not all the news here is good. For
one thing, black-white segregation has not fallen at the same rate
throughout the country. In numerous metropolitan areas, especially in the Midwest and Northeast, it remains stubbornly high.40
In addition, segregation scores for other minorities, namely Hispanics and Asian Americans, have not declined in recent years.
Instead, they mostly have held steady, albeit at lower levels and
despite these groups’ rising populations.41 And even as racial segregation wanes, income segregation is worsening. Mixed-income
neighborhoods are becoming rarer, and the poor and the rich are
40 See John R. Logan and Brian J. Stults, The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census *9 (US2010 Project, Mar 24, 2011), archived
at http://perma.cc/FU6T-D845 (labeling the “persistence of very high black-white segregation in a few major Northeastern and Midwestern metropolitan areas” a “striking feature”
of recent decades).
41 See John Iceland and Gregory Sharp, White Residential Segregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Conceptual Issues, Patterns, and Trends from the U.S. Census, 1980 to
2010, 32 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev 663, 665 (2013) (“Hispanic and Asian segregation
has not declined markedly over the past three decades.”).
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increasingly isolated from each other.42 None of these developments refutes the optimistic premise of this project. But it is important to remember the clouds and not just the silver lining.
I. RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICA
This is an odd sort of law review article, premised as it is on
a sociological phenomenon, racial desegregation, of which the legal literature is mostly unaware. Because of this oddity, I think
it is necessary to document the phenomenon thoroughly before
turning to what it means for civil rights law. This documentation
is the purpose of this Part. I hope it will convince readers that a
trend that may seem counterintuitive actually is occurring.
I begin by surveying the various measures of segregation, as
well as the various groups and geographic units to which they
may be applied. For the most part, I use the index of dissimilarity
with respect to blacks and whites, for census tracts nested within
metropolitan areas. Next, I summarize the changes in segregation over time. Black-white segregation has declined sharply
since 1970, while levels for Hispanics and Asian Americans have
stayed constant (but lower) over this period. I then examine some
of the reasons why black-white segregation is falling. Housing discrimination is rarer now, whites are more open to living in diverse
neighborhoods, and blacks are migrating to metropolitan areas
more conducive to integration. Lastly, I identify some notable caveats. Black-white segregation is still very high in certain areas,
it remains sensitive to financial shocks, and socioeconomic separation is rising.
A.

Definitions

Sociologists have argued for decades over how best to measure segregation. In a well-known 1955 article, Professors Otis
Duncan and Beverly Duncan observed that “[t]here have been
proposed . . . several alternative indexes of the degree of residential segregation,” all derivable from what they called the “segregation curve.”43 Likewise, in an influential 1988 paper, Professors
42 See Sean F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, Income Inequality and Income Segregation, 116 Am J Sociology 1092, 1116 (2011) (“Average metropolitan area income segregation . . . [grew] from 1970 to 2000, with the fastest increase occurring in the 1980s.”).
43 Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes, 20 Am Sociological Rev 210, 210 (1955). The Duncans also concluded that
“there is little information in any of the indexes beyond that contained in the index [of
dissimilarity] and the city nonwhite proportion.” Id at 214.
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Massey and Denton identified “20 potential measures of residential segregation.”44 They also claimed that each of these metrics
corresponded to one of five distinct dimensions of segregation:
evenness, exposure, concentration, centralization, and clustering.45
Fortunately, segregation analysis does not, in fact, require
dozens of indices or a fistful of dimensions. It is now reasonably
clear that three of Massey and Denton’s dimensions (concentration, centralization, and clustering) collapse into evenness.46 A
group that is packed into small areas, or located in the city center,
or clustered in a contiguous enclave, necessarily has an uneven
spatial distribution.
There also is a good deal of consensus as to how to measure
the two remaining dimensions: evenness and exposure. The index
of dissimilarity is the most common evenness metric.47 It represents the share of a group’s members who would have to move
from one geographic subunit to another in order for the group to
be spread uniformly across a broader geographic region.48 A score
of 100 percent indicates complete segregation, in that every group
member would have to move, while a score of 0 percent means
that a group is perfectly integrated. And the index of isolation is
the most popular measure of exposure.49 It denotes, for the typical

44 Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, The Dimensions of Residential Segregation, 67 Soc Forces 281, 282 (1988).
45 See id at 283. See also generally Sean F. Reardon and Glenn Firebaugh, Measures
of Multigroup Segregation, 32 Sociological Methodology 33 (2002) (defining and assessing
six measures of multigroup segregation); Michael J. White, Segregation and Diversity
Measures in Population Distribution, 52 Population Index 198 (1986) (defining and assessing ten measures of biracial segregation).
46 See Sean F. Reardon and David O’Sullivan, Measures of Spatial Segregation, 34
Sociological Methodology 121, 125 (2004) (observing that “if we derived a segregation
measure from information about the exact locations and spatial environments of individuals . . . there would be no conceptual distinction at all between evenness and clustering”);
id at 127 (noting that “centralization and concentration dimensions can be seen as specific
subcategories of spatial unevenness”).
47 See Claude S. Fischer, et al, Distinguishing the Geographic Levels and Social Dimensions of U.S. Metropolitan Segregation, 1960–2000, 41 Demography 37, 41 (2004) (calling the dissimilarity index “perhaps the most common” measure of segregation); Salvatore
Saporito and Deenesh Sohoni, Coloring outside the Lines: Racial Segregation in Public
Schools and Their Attendance Boundaries, 79 Sociology of Educ 81, 93 (2006) (characterizing the dissimilarity index as “the ‘workhorse’ of segregation measures”).
48 See Massey and Denton, 67 Soc Forces at 284 (cited in note 44) (defining the dissimilarity index mathematically).
49 Iceland and Sharp, 32 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 670 (cited in note 41) (calling
the isolation index “the most widely used measure of exposure”) (emphasis omitted);
Andrew L. Spivak and Shannon M. Monnat, The Influence of Race, Class, and Metropolitan Area Characteristics on African-American Residential Segregation, 94 Soc Sci Q 1414,
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group member, the share of people in her subunit who belong to
the same group.50 It too varies from 0 percent (no same-group
neighbors) to 100 percent (all same-group neighbors).
Most sociologists further agree that, of the dissimilarity and
isolation indices, the former better captures the colloquial meaning of segregation. If, in Massey and Denton’s words, “residential
segregation is the degree to which two or more groups live separately from one another,”51 the concept is closer to the evenness of
groups’ distributions than to their exposure to one another.52 The
other advantage of the dissimilarity index is that it is insensitive
to groups’ population shares. Given a particular residential pattern, it does not rise or fall as groups’ numbers change.53 In contrast, the isolation index is tied closely to group size. “Other factors being equal, larger ethnic groups will be more isolated than
smaller ones simply because there are more coethnics present
with which to share neighborhoods.”54 I therefore focus on the dissimilarity index here, though I also refer occasionally to the isolation index.
Importantly, both of these indices can be calculated for only
two groups at a time.55 African Americans are usually one of the
two in the work I discuss, both because they have experienced the
most severe discrimination of any American racial minority and
because more information is available about their residential patterns.56 But I also provide data, when it exists, about Hispanic
1419 (2013) (describing the isolation index as one of “two types of exposure indices commonly used to measure residential segregation”).
50 See Massey and Denton, 67 Soc Forces at 288 (cited in note 44) (defining the isolation index mathematically).
51 Id at 282.
52 See, for example, Jeffrey M. Timberlake and John Iceland, Change in Racial and
Ethnic Residential Inequality in American Cities, 1970–2000, 6 City & Community 335,
340 (2007) (noting historical consensus among some experts that “the index of dissimilarity [ ] was the best measure of residential segregation when conceptualized as evenness of
population distribution”).
53 See John Iceland, Where We Live Now: Immigration and Race in the United States
41 (California 2009) (“The dissimilarity index has the advantage of not being sensitive to
the relative size of the groups in question.”).
54 Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 103 (cited in note 11).
55 See Reardon and Firebaugh, 32 Sociological Methodology at 34 (cited in note 45)
(“[T]he major methodological developments in segregation measurement have been limited to measuring segregation between two population groups.”).
56 In particular, blacks are the only minority group for which historical segregation
statistics back to the nineteenth century are available. See, for example, Massey and
Denton, American Apartheid at 21 (cited in note 3) (citing segregation statistics for blacks
from circa 1860); Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *3–4 (cited in
note 11) (citing segregation statistics for blacks from 1890).
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and Asian American segregation. The second group in most analyses is the non-Hispanic white population. Some studies, though,
use all people who do not belong to the racial minority at issue. It
is worth noting as well that scholars have begun to develop multigroup variants of the dissimilarity index, such as the entropy
index.57 These alternatives are better in theory because they do
not treat segregation as a biracial phenomenon,58 and I cite them
when possible. Regrettably, they have not been calculated for
nearly as many areas or years.
The last methodological choice for indices of segregation is
which spatial units to apply them to.59 Both a subunit (such as a
census block, block group, or tract) and a broader region (such as
a city, metropolitan area, or state) must be selected. Most studies
use census tracts as subunits, because they roughly coincide with
neighborhoods and are designed to be “as homogeneous as possible with respect to population characteristics, economic status,
and living conditions.”60 And metropolitan areas are used most often as broader regions, because they have “a high degree of economic and social integration” and constitute the relevant housing
and labor markets for most people.61 Accordingly, the segregation
57 See, for example, John Iceland, The Multigroup Entropy Index (Also Known as
Theil’s H or the Information Theory Index) *7–8 (Dec 2004), archived at
http://perma.cc/H8PU-FD7K (defining the entropy index mathematically); Reardon and
Firebaugh, 32 Sociological Methodology at 37 (cited in note 45) (same). Scholars also have
devised explicitly spatial measures that take into account where exactly people are located. See, for example, Reardon and O’Sullivan, 34 Sociological Methodology at 136–44
(cited in note 46); Barrett A. Lee, et al, Beyond the Census Tract: Patterns and Determinants of Racial Segregation at Multiple Geographic Scales, 73 Am Sociological Rev 766,
770–73 (2008). These metrics are used even more infrequently than the multigroup ones.
58 See Mary J. Fischer, The Relative Importance of Income and Race in Determining
Residential Outcomes in U.S. Urban Areas, 1970-2000, 38 Urban Affairs Rev 669, 676
(2003) (“One advantage of entropy-based measures is this ability to examine segregation
between more than two groups simultaneously.”). Also, usefully, the entropy index is additive and so can be subdivided between different geographic levels. See id at 675.
59 See, for example, Chad R. Farrell, Bifurcation, Fragmentation or Integration? The
Racial and Geographical Structure of US Metropolitan Segregation, 1990–2000, 45 Urban
Stud 467, 468 (2008) (“The measurement of segregation usually entails an effort to quantify the unequal distribution of social groups across smaller geographical units . . . within
a larger region.”).
60 Census Tracts and Block Numbering Areas, archived at http://perma.cc/QN6G
-BSRQ, in Geographic Areas Reference Manual *10-1, 10-1 (Bureau of the Census, Nov
1994), archived at http://perma.cc/96L8-FD65. See also, for example, Iceland and Sharp,
32 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 669 (cited in note 41) (“Census tracts are also by far the
unit most used in research on residential segregation.”).
61 Metropolitan Areas, archived at http://perma.cc/U4DX-AWFH, in Geographic Areas Reference Manual *13-1, 13-1 (cited in note 60). See also J. Eric Oliver, The Paradoxes
of Integration: Race, Neighborhood, and Civic Life in Multiethnic America 23 (Chicago
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statistics I present below typically are for tracts located in metropolitan areas.62
This background should suffice for present purposes. Next, I
summarize trends in segregation for African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans for all periods for which data is available. For the above reasons, I devote the most attention to the index of dissimilarity, calculated for blacks and whites and for
tracts in metropolitan areas.
B.

Trends

Start with the racial separation undergone by blacks. As described in harrowing detail in American Apartheid—and as
shown in Figure 1 below, which is borrowed from a recent study
by Professors Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor—it grew steadily
from 1890 to 1970.63 The black-nonblack dissimilarity score of the
average metropolitan area, weighted by each area’s black population, increased from about 45 percent to about 80 percent during
this era.64 Similarly, the average black-nonblack isolation score
rose from roughly 20 percent to roughly 60 percent.65 A useful rule
of thumb is that segregation scores are high if they are above 60
percent, moderate if between 30 percent and 60 percent, and low

2010); Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 101 (cited in note 11) (“Residential segregation usually refers to the distribution of groups . . . within metropolitan
areas.”).
62 In general, the smaller the subunit considered, the higher the resulting segregation score. More variation is expressed between rather than within smaller subunits. See
David W.S. Wong, Spatial Dependency of Segregation Indices, 41 Canadian Geographer
128, 130–31 (1997). However, areas’ segregation rankings tend not to change much when
different subunits are used. See Sean F. Reardon, et al, The Geographic Scale of Metropolitan Racial Segregation, 45 Demography 489, 499 (2008).
63 See Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *4 (cited in note 11).
See also Massey and Denton, American Apartheid at 21, 47 (cited in note 3) (providing dissimilarity index scores for selected cities from 1860 to 1970).
64 See Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *4 (cited in note 11).
Unfortunately, Glaeser and Vigdor do not calculate black-white segregation statistics, which
are usually slightly higher. I am unaware of any work presenting black-white figures over
such a long period.
65 See id. Glaeser and Vigdor use an idiosyncratic definition of the isolation index,
adjusting its values downward by the black share of the metropolitan area population. See
id at *3. The index then “measures the tendency for members of one group to live in neighborhoods where their share of the population is above the citywide average.” Id (emphasis
added).
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if below 30 percent.66 On this scale, the peak dissimilarity experienced by blacks was extraordinarily severe, high enough to warrant labels like “hypersegregation,”67 and the peak isolation was
very troubling too.68
Since 1970, though, the situation has changed markedly for
the better. Black segregation scores have now fallen for four
straight decades, undoing much of the rise that occurred during
the twentieth century. According to Glaeser and Vigdor, blacknonblack dissimilarity reached 55 percent in 2010, or about the
same level as in 1910, and black-nonblack isolation neared 30 percent, or close to its 1920 threshold.69 Using a similar methodology,
Professors John Iceland and Gregory Sharp report nearly identical 2010 black-nonblack dissimilarity and isolation scores.70 Without weighting by black population, and using whites rather than
nonblacks as the reference group, Professor William Frey calculates an even lower 2010 black-white dissimilarity score of 47 percent.71 And both weighting and using whites as the reference
group, Professor Reynolds Farley,72 Professors John Logan and
Brian Stults,73 and Massey and Professor Jacob Rugh74 arrive at
black-white dissimilarity scores around 59 percent. No matter
how it is computed, then, black segregation no longer qualifies as
high for the first time in a hundred years. In fact, as Professor
David Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor point out, it is about the same

66 David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob L. Vigdor, The Rise and Decline of
the American Ghetto, 107 J Polit Econ 455, 458 (1999); Rachel E. Dwyer, Poverty, Prosperity, and Place: The Shape of Class Segregation in the Age of Extremes, 57 Soc Probs 114,
123 (2010).
67 See Massey and Denton, 26 Demography at 383 (cited in note 4).
68 Measured the usual way, again, the peak isolation was somewhat higher than reported by Glaeser and Vigdor. See note 65. See also Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at
213 (cited in note 14) (showing 1970 black-white isolation of about 67 percent).
69 See Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *4 (cited in note 11).
70 See Iceland and Sharp, 32 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 673 (cited in note 41)
(providing data from 1980 to 2010). Their isolation index score of around 45 percent appears higher than Glaeser and Vigdor’s only because they do not adjust downward by the
black share of the metropolitan area population. See note 65.
71 See Frey, Diversity Explosion at 169, 173 (cited in note 11) (providing data from
1930 to 2010).
72 See Farley, 10 Contexts at 39 (cited in note 10) (providing data from 1980 to 2010).
73 See Logan and Stults, The Persistence of Segregation at *4 (cited in note 40)
(providing data from 1940 to 2010). However, Logan and Stults find that black-white exposure has been roughly constant since 1940, due to whites’ declining share of the overall
population. See id at *4–5.
74 See Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 212 (cited in note 14) (providing data
from 1970 to 2010).
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as the spatial separation currently experienced by immigrants
from Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, and Russia.75
What accounts for this striking improvement? I address underlying causes later, but the arithmetical explanation is twofold.
First, within metropolitan areas, blacks increasingly are leaving
heavily black neighborhoods and moving to communities with
larger white populations—which now are more demographically
stable than in the past. The neighborhoods blacks are exiting are
largely inner-city ghettos. Detroit and Chicago’s South and West
Sides, for example, each lost close to two hundred thousand black
residents from 2000 to 2010.76 The communities blacks are entering tend to be suburbs that formerly were mostly white but now
are multiracial.77 But there also are numerous cases of urban
neighborhoods, like Chicago’s Uptown, New York City’s Jackson
Heights, and Oakland’s Fruitvale, developing impressive diversity.78 And the stability of newly integrated communities has increased over time, though they still are more prone to demographic transition than racially homogeneous neighborhoods.79
75 See David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob L. Vigdor, Is the Melting Pot
Still Hot? Explaining the Resurgence of Immigration Segregation, 90 Rev Econ & Stat 478,
482 (2008) (showing dissimilarity scores at or above 50 percent for all of these groups in 2000).
76 See Frey, Diversity Explosion at 155 (cited in note 11); Glaeser and Vigdor, The
End of the Segregated Century at *2 (cited in note 11) (“[T]he dominant trend in predominantly black neighborhoods nationwide has been population loss.”). This exodus seems
to be fulfilling Professor William Julius Wilson’s famous prediction that, as middle- and
upper-income blacks exit inner-city areas, “the truly disadvantaged” will be left behind.
See generally William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago 1987). A new frontier for civil rights law may be how
to address the particular needs of “the truly disadvantaged,” as opposed to those of blacks
generally.
77 See Myron Orfield and Thomas F. Luce, America’s Racially Diverse Suburbs: Opportunities and Challenges, 23 Housing Pol Debate 395, 401 (2013) (finding that “[d]iverse
suburbs” now “represent the largest single suburban segment—53 million people in 2010,
up from 40 million in 2000”). See also Ingrid Gould Ellen, How Integrated Did We Become
during the 1990s?, in John Goering, ed, Fragile Rights within Cities: Government, Housing, and Fairness 123, 130 (Rowman & Littlefield 2007) (showing that the proportion of
nearly all-white census tracts fell from about 60 percent in 1970 to about 15 percent in
2000); Frey, Diversity Explosion at 159–66 (cited in note 11).
78 See Maly, Beyond Segregation at 48–213 (cited in note 9) (discussing these neighborhoods); Philip Nyden, Michael Maly, and John Lukehart, The Emergence of Stable Racially and Ethnically Diverse Urban Communities: A Case Study of Nine U.S. Cities, 8
Housing Pol Debate 491, 492 (1997) (surveying “communities where racial and ethnic diversity has been maintained for as long as 30 years”).
79 See Ellen, How Integrated Did We Become during the 1990s? at 134 (cited in note 77)
(finding that the stability of neighborhoods with black populations between 10 percent and
50 percent “rose from 62 percent during the 1970s to 78 percent during the 1980s . . . to
80 percent during the 1990s”); Chad R. Farrell and Barrett A. Lee, Racial Diversity and
Change in Metropolitan Neighborhoods, 40 Soc Sci Rsrch 1108, 1116–18 (2011) (finding
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Second, across metropolitan areas, blacks are migrating in
large numbers from the Midwest and Northeast (where segregation levels are higher) to the South and West (where they are
lower). The proportion of the country’s blacks living in the Midwest and Northeast fell from 50 percent in 1970 to 38 percent in
2005–2009.80 Over the same period, the South’s share rose from
41 percent to 52 percent as millions of blacks streamed to metropolitan areas like Atlanta, Charlotte, and Dallas.81 This reversal
of the earlier Great Migration is responsible for up to one-fifth of
the overall decline in segregation since 1970.82
Also interestingly, desegregation is not taking place because
of gentrification, at least not to any significant extent. Predominantly black neighborhoods are very stable, in that they are more
than 80 percent likely to remain predominantly black from one
census to the next.83 These communities also are very unattractive to whites. Only about 2 percent of them achieve a substantial
level of black-white integration over the course of a decade.84 True,
there are several high-profile exceptions, like New York City’s
Bushwick, Philadelphia’s University City, and Washington, DC’s
U Street Corridor.85 But for the most part, gentrification is a trend
of modest bite, “occurr[ing] primarily at the fringe of the ghetto.”86
Turning next to Hispanic and Asian American segregation,
reliable figures are available for only the last few decades. The
census did not ask about Hispanic status before 1970, and the

that several types of integrated neighborhoods have stability rates above 50 percent, which
are still lower than the stability rates of homogeneous communities); Samantha Friedman,
Do Declines in Residential Segregation Mean Stable Neighborhood Racial Integration in
Metropolitan America? A Research Note, 37 Soc Sci Rsrch 920, 927 (2008) (same).
80 See Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 106 (cited in note 11).
81 See id. See also Frey, Diversity Explosion at 114–30 (cited in note 11) (discussing
the “historic reversal” of black regional migration back to the South and its metropolitan
areas).
82 See Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *8–9 (cited in note 11)
(arriving at the one-fifth figure); Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 115
(cited in note 11) (finding that interregional migration accounts for 12 percent of the decline
in black-white dissimilarity and 8 percent of the decline in black-nonblack dissimilarity).
83 See Ellen, How Integrated Did We Become during the 1990s? at 133 (cited in note
77); Farrell and Lee, 40 Soc Sci Rsrch at 1117 (cited in note 79); Friedman, 37 Soc Sci
Rsrch at 927 (cited in note 79).
84 See Friedman, 37 Soc Sci Rsrch at 927 (cited in note 79).
85 For a general analysis of the dynamics of gentrification, see generally Terra
McKinnish, Randall Walsh, and T. Kirk White, Who Gentrifies Low-Income Neighborhoods?, 67 J Urban Econ 180 (2010).
86 Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *9 (cited in note 11).
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Asian American population was too small prior to 1980 for its distribution to be analyzed accurately.87 During the period for which
data exists, the situation has been essentially static. Hispanic dissimilarity has hovered around 50 percent and Asian American
dissimilarity around 40 percent—both squarely in the moderate
zone.88 Figure 1 illustrates this point with a chart from a recent
study by Rugh and Massey using whites as the reference group.89
Farley,90 Iceland and Sharp,91 and Logan and Stults92 reach virtually identical results using whites or nonminorities as the reference groups. Figure 1 also shows that the isolation of Hispanics
and Asian Americans has increased since 1980.93 The reason, of
course, is the remarkable growth of these groups’ populations,
which necessarily exposes their members to more of their racial
peers.94
But the placid surface of Hispanic and Asian American segregation hides some turbulence beneath. Hispanics and Asian
Americans who were born in the United States have dissimilarity
scores about 12 percentage points and 8 percentage points lower,
respectively, than their foreign-born compatriots.95 Foreign-born
Hispanics and Asian Americans also become steadily more integrated the longer they remain in the country.96 The stationary

87 See Iceland and Sharp, 32 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 668 n 1 (cited in note 41)
(“The challenge with using 1970 data is that one cannot distinguish between the ‘white’
and ‘non-Hispanic white’ population in census public use files. We also do not have data
on the number of Asians in that year.”).
88 See text accompanying note 66 (noting that dissimilarity scores in the 30 percent
to 60 percent range indicate moderate segregation).
89 Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 212–13 (cited in note 14); Glaeser and Vigdor,
The End of the Segregated Century at *9 (cited in note 11). All of these studies weight
metropolitan area values by the areas’ Hispanic or Asian American populations.
90 See Farley, 10 Contexts at 39 (cited in note 10) (using whites as the reference
group).
91 See Iceland and Sharp, 32 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 673 (cited in note 41)
(using nonminorities as the reference group).
92 See Logan and Stults, The Persistence of Segregation at *11, 17 (cited in note 40)
(using whites as the reference group).
93 Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 213 (cited in note 14). See also Iceland and
Sharp, 32 Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 673 (cited in note 41) (showing a gentler rise due
to the use of nonminorities as the reference group).
94 See text accompanying note 54 (noting that the isolation index is sensitive to
groups’ population shares).
95 See Iceland, Where We Live Now at 58 (cited in note 53) (using whites as the reference group).
96 See id. See also id at 63–68 (showing similar results for specific countries of origin);
Daniel T. Lichter, et al, Residential Segregation in New Hispanic Destinations: Cities, Suburbs, and Rural Communities Compared, 39 Soc Sci Rsrch 215, 222 (2010) (finding that
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top-line statistics thus reflect two opposing forces fighting to a
draw: on the one hand, surging immigration with its segregative
impact, and on the other, the ongoing assimilation of longer-term
residents.97
The top-line figures for black segregation also are the product
of several different forces. Justice Potter Stewart once deemed
these causes “unknown and perhaps unknowable.”98 But as I explain below, sociologists actually have learned a good deal about
the drivers of racial separation. Because I am most interested in
the decline in black segregation since 1970, I stress factors that
themselves have shifted over time.
FIGURE 1. TRENDS IN SEGREGATION99

C.

Causes

Discrimination by public or private parties is one obvious explanation for segregation. If the government tries to confine minorities to certain areas—by reserving neighborhoods for different racial groups, refusing to provide mortgage assistance to
Hispanic-white segregation is higher in “new destinations” than in “established Hispanic
places”).
97 See Frey, Diversity Explosion at 178 (cited in note 11) (“[T]he average ‘static’ segregation picture for Hispanics and Asians conflates both a turn toward integration among
long-term residents and higher segregation levels among new immigrants.”).
98 Milliken v Bradley, 418 US 717, 756 n 2 (1974) (Stewart concurring).
99 Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *4 (cited in note 11) (left
graph); Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 212 (cited in note 14) (top-right graph); Rugh
and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 213 (cited in note 14) (bottom-right graph).
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mixed communities, restricting public housing to inner cities, and
so on100—it is unsurprising that segregated residential patterns
arise. Likewise, racial separation follows naturally from private
actions such as landlords declining to rent to minorities, realtors
steering customers on racial grounds, and threats of violence
against minorities who dare to cross the color line.101 As American
Apartheid vividly depicts, all of these practices (and more) were
used for generations to create and maintain black segregation.102
However, housing discrimination has been illegal since the
FHA’s passage in 1968, and two kinds of evidence show that its
prevalence has, in fact, decreased. First, HUD has conducted four
nationwide paired-test studies, initially in 1977 and most recently in 2012.103 These studies rely on paired testers, matched in
all respects except for race, to determine how often discrimination
occurs.104 The idea is that if the minority tester is treated differently despite being as qualified as the nonminority tester, race
must account for the disparity.105 As the graphs reproduced in Figure 2 reveal, both rental and sales discrimination, against both
blacks and Hispanics, have declined since 1977.106 Blacks are now
almost as likely as whites to be told that advertised properties are
available (compared to differences as high as 20 percentage points
for rental units in 1977).107 The probability that blacks will be
shown fewer properties than whites also has fallen to less than 5
percent for rental units (from a 1989 high of almost 20 percent).108
The figures for Hispanics reflect similar improvement, albeit from
lower peaks.109
100 See Massey and Denton, American Apartheid at 17–59 (cited in note 3) (describing
these and other discriminatory governmental policies).
101 See id at 83–114 (discussing these and other discriminatory private practices).
102 See notes 100–01.
103 See Turner, et al, Housing Discrimination against Racial and Ethnic Minorities
at *xix (cited in note 15).
104 See id at *5–11 (discussing paired testing protocols).
105 See id at *3 (“When large numbers of consistent and comparable tests are conducted
. . . they directly measure patterns of adverse treatment based on race or ethnicity.”).
106 See id at *68.
107 See Turner, et al, Housing Discrimination against Racial and Ethnic Minorities at
*68 (cited in note 15). All of these percentages are net figures that indicate how often the
nonminority tester is favored minus how often the minority tester is favored. See id at *xii.
108 See id at *68. However, the trend for homes is more static. See id.
109 See id. For examples of other scholars noticing these encouraging developments,
see Ingrid Gould Ellen, Continuing Isolation: Segregation in America Today, in James H.
Carr and Nandinee K. Kutty, eds, Segregation: The Rising Costs for America 261, 265–66
(Routledge 2008); Bo Zhao, Jan Ondrich, and John Yinger, Why Do Real Estate Brokers
Continue to Discriminate? Evidence from the 2000 Housing Discrimination Study, 59 J
Urban Econ 394, 409–10 (2006).
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Second, sociologists have investigated whether blacks pay
more than whites for equivalent housing within a metropolitan
area. If they do, it may be because their residential choices are
constrained by public or private discrimination. In the absence of
the discrimination, they presumably would move to more affordable neighborhoods. According to work by Cutler and his coauthors, the black housing premium was substantial in 1940, suggesting “collective action racism on the part of whites.”110 But by
1970 the premium had dropped by about 75 percent, and by 1990
it actually had switched signs, indicating that blacks paid less
than whites for comparable accommodation.111 Other scholars report similar results; as Professor Stephen Ross notes, “not a single study has found evidence that African American[s] paid more
for housing during the 1980’s or 1990’s.”112
Moreover, not only is housing discrimination falling, but its
decline has been linked causally to lower segregation. Professor
George Galster used the HUD paired-test data to measure the incidence of discriminatory practices in different metropolitan areas, as well as black-white dissimilarity scores to assess segregation.113 He found that discrimination is a powerful determinant of
racial separation. “If we could somehow eliminate discrimination
in both rental and sales sectors . . . we would predict . . . a 25point (50 percent) decrease in the index of segregation within the
black community.”114 This is a large effect, and it helps explain
why discrimination and segregation have decreased in tandem
over the last few decades.115
An alternative account of segregation attributes it to racial
groups’ divergent residential preferences. Professor Thomas
Schelling popularized this explanation in a famous 1971 paper.116
He explained how almost complete racial separation could arise
even if there were no discrimination and most whites and blacks

110

Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 107 J Polit Econ at 483 (cited in note 66).
See id at 483–87.
112 Stephen L. Ross, Understanding Racial Segregation: What Is Known about the Effect of Housing Discrimination *17 (University of Connecticut Economics Working Paper
No 2008-15R, Nov 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/7CGD-PEWR.
113 See George C. Galster, Housing Discrimination and Urban Poverty of AfricanAmericans, 2 J Housing Rsrch 87, 94–107 (1991).
114 Id at 113.
115 See Massey and Denton, American Apartheid at 109 (cited in note 3) (commenting
that Galster “confirmed the empirical link between discrimination and segregation”).
116 See generally Thomas C. Schelling, Dynamic Models of Segregation, 1 J Math Sociology 143 (1971).
111
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were willing to live in integrated neighborhoods.117 The crux of the
problem is that whites and blacks often mean different things by
integration. Whites may be willing to tolerate communities up to,
say, 20 percent black, while blacks may prefer areas that are, say,
50 percent black.118 In this scenario, blacks will continue entering
a neighborhood until it is evenly split. But whites will exit when
the black population hits 20 percent, thus producing segregation
despite both groups’ wishes to the contrary.119
The extent of racial separation in Schelling’s model is highly
sensitive to whites’ preferences.120 And on this front too, the trends
are encouraging. Farley carried out surveys of white Detroit-area
residents in 1976, 1992, and 2004, each time asking about their
views of neighborhoods in which one to seven out of fifteen homes
are owned by blacks.121 As the graphs reproduced in Figure 2 display, all of the change in this period favored integration.122 For
instance, with respect to a community that is one-fifth black, 83
percent of whites said they would feel comfortable living there in
2004 (versus 58 percent in 1976), and 8 percent said they would
leave the area (versus 24 percent).123 Nationwide polls asking
whether whites would sell their homes if blacks came to live “next
door” or “in great numbers in your neighborhood” point to similar
progress.124 By the late 1990s, almost no whites said they would
sell if blacks moved in next door (versus nearly 40 percent in

117

See id at 148.
See Bell and Parchomovsky, 100 Colum L Rev at 1987 (cited in note 8) (relying on
Schelling’s assumptions).
119 See id at 1985–87 (discussing the “tipping” phenomenon); Schelling, 1 J Math
Sociology at 181–86 (cited in note 116) (same). There are additional complexities to
Schelling’s model, such as the distributions of whites’ and blacks’ preferences, that I do
not address here.
120 See Schelling, 1 J Math Sociology at 171 (cited in note 116) (“The outcome depends
on the shapes we attribute to the tolerance schedules [of blacks and whites].”).
121 See Farley, 10 Contexts at 39–41 (cited in note 10).
122 See id at 40.
123 See id. For examples of other scholars noting this improvement, see Camille
Zubrinsky Charles, The Dynamics of Racial Residential Segregation, 29 Ann Rev Sociology
167, 184 (2003); David R. Harris, Why Are Whites and Blacks Averse to Black Neighbors?,
30 Soc Sci Rsrch 100, 101 (2001). Black residential preferences largely held steady over
this period, reflecting “a clear preference for 50/50 neighborhoods.” Camille Zubrinsky
Charles, Who Will Live Near Whom?, 17 Poverty & Race 1, 2 (Sept/Oct 2008).
124 Lawrence D. Bobo, Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, in Neil J. Smelser, William Julius Wilson, and Faith Mitchell, eds, 1 America
Becoming: Racial Trends and Their Consequences 264, 270 (National Academy 2001).
118

STEPHANOPOULOS_ART_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

1352

The University of Chicago Law Review

9/20/2016 2:00 PM

[83:1329

1965), and about 30 percent said they would sell if faced with
great numbers of blacks (versus about 70 percent).125
Of course, survey results can be criticized on the ground that
respondents are reluctant to admit to racist preferences. But
Cutler and his coauthors find that self-professed views are tied
to actual segregation levels.126 Black-white dissimilarity scores
are higher in metropolitan areas where more whites believe that
“[w]hite people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods” and oppose “living in a neighborhood where half of your
neighbors [are] black.”127 Also persuasively, Professors David
Card, Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein calculate “tipping
points”—the black population shares above which whites exit
neighborhoods en masse—for several metropolitan areas over
time.128 In Midwestern cities like Chicago and Detroit, tipping
points increased from almost 0 percent in 1940 to roughly 10 percent in 1990.129 Nationwide, they rose from about 9 percent in the
1970s to about 14 percent in the 1990s.130 People’s answers to
polls, it seems, are not just cheap talk.
That people’s answers are improving, though, leaves open the
question of why this shift is occurring. Part of the story surely is
a society-wide decline in antiblack racism.131 But as Logan and
Professor Charles Zhang show, another piece is the growth of Hispanic and Asian American immigration—and the accompanying
rise in the number of neighborhoods with sizable white, black,
Hispanic, and Asian American contingents.132 These multiracial
125 See id. See also Howard Schuman, Charlotte Steeh, and Lawrence Bobo, Racial
Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations 112 (Harvard 1985) (showing similar
trends up to the late 1970s).
126 See Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 107 J Polit Econ at 488–90 (cited in note 66).
127 Id. See also Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 216 (cited in note 14) (finding
that antiblack racism, measured by the frequency of Google searches for racial slurs, is a
“powerful and highly significant” driver of the black-white dissimilarity index).
128 See David Card, Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein, Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation, 123 Q J Econ 177, 180–91 (2008); David Card, Alexandre Mas, and Jesse Rothstein,
Are Mixed Neighborhoods Always Unstable? Two-Sided and One-Sided Tipping *5–13
(NBER Working Paper No 14470, Nov 2008), archived at http://perma.cc/3AD9-K9HL.
129 See Card, Mas, and Rothstein, Are Mixed Neighborhoods Always Unstable? at *21
(cited in note 128).
130 See Card, Mas, and Rothstein, 123 Q J Econ at 192 (cited in note 128).
131 See generally Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo, Racial Attitudes in America (cited in
note 125) (finding decreases in racism in many areas). See also Iceland and Sharp, 32
Population Rsrch & Pol Rev at 666 (cited in note 41) (“The proportion of Whites holding
blatantly racist attitudes has dropped considerably over the decades.”).
132 See Logan and Zhang, 115 Am J Sociology at 1088 (cited in note 18) (showing an
increase in the number of multiracial, white-black-Hispanic-Asian (WBHA) tracts from
2,422 in 1980 to 3,792 in 2000).
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communities are quite stable, enduring into the next decade
about 75 percent of the time.133 Both whites and blacks also are
willing to move into them, in contrast to most other neighborhood
types.134 And the more whites and blacks that entered them from
1980 to 2000, the more metropolitan areas’ black-white dissimilarity scores fell.135 These findings suggest that whites are now
more willing to live with blacks, at least in part, because they do
not have to live only with blacks. Hispanics and Asian Americans
increasingly serve as buffers that convince whites not to leave
communities with substantial black populations.136
A final set of causes of segregation involves metropolitan areas’ characteristics.137 Studies by several scholars conclude that
residential patterns, to some degree, are a function of areas’ demographics, housing stock, and policies. In particular: Total metropolitan area population is linked to higher segregation.138 Areas
where more residents belong to the military tend to be less segregated.139 Areas where more housing has been constructed in the

133 See id at 1093. See also note 79 and accompanying text (noting the increased stability of multiracial neighborhoods).
134 See Logan and Zhang, 115 Am J Sociology at 1091–92 (cited in note 18) (showing
that almost all WBHA tracts experienced increases in their white and black population
shares in the period between 1980 and 2000).
135 See id.
136 See Frey, Diversity Explosion at 174 (cited in note 11) (noting that “other minorities can serve to ‘buffer’ these [white-black] divisions”); Iceland, Where We Live Now at 6
(cited in note 53) (observing that “immigration has softened the black-white divide”).
137 People’s incomes are still another potential driver of segregation. It could arise
because different racial groups have different average incomes, and so can afford to live
in different neighborhoods. Historically, income made almost no difference for black segregation; rich blacks were just about as racially separated as poor blacks. Other factors,
such as housing discrimination and divergent residential preferences, thus were responsible for black segregation. See, for example, Massey and Denton, American Apartheid at
86 (cited in note 3); Camille Zubrinsky Charles, Neighborhood Racial-Composition Preferences: Evidence from a Multiethnic Metropolis, 47 Soc Probs 379, 380 (2000). But in recent
years, income has become a better predictor of how segregated blacks are. Wealthy blacks
are now substantially less racially separated than disadvantaged ones. This confirms the
account of discrimination and residential preferences no longer obstructing integration to
the same extent. See, for example, Iceland, Where We Live Now at 47 (cited in note 53);
Lincoln Quillian, Why Is Black-White Residential Segregation So Persistent?: Evidence on
Three Theories from Migration Data, 31 Soc Sci Rsrch 197, 218–20 (2002).
138 See Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 100, 110 (cited in note 11);
John R. Logan, Brian J. Stults, and Reynolds Farley, Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades of Change, 41 Demography 1, 13, 15 (2004); Rugh and Massey, 11
Du Bois Rev at 217, 218 (cited in note 14); Timberlake and Iceland, 6 City & Community
at 352 (cited in note 52).
139 See Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 100, 110 (cited in note 11);
Logan, Stults, and Farley, 41 Demography at 14, 15 (cited in note 138); Rugh and Massey,
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previous decade also usually exhibit less racial separation.140 And
the more permissive an area’s zoning regime (measured by the
weighted average of the development densities allowed by each of
the jurisdictions within it), the lower the area’s segregation.141
These factors have contributed to the decline in black segregation because they favor the southern and western metropolitan
areas to which blacks have been migrating.142 Iceland, Sharp, and
Professor Jeffrey Timberlake observe that southern and western
areas have fewer total residents, larger military populations, and
newer housing stock than their midwestern and northeastern
peers.143 Similarly, Jonathan Rothwell notes that “[w]ith respect
to density regulation, the west is the most liberal, followed by the
south, and both are significantly more liberal than the Midwest
and north-east.”144 As blacks move from areas whose attributes
worsen segregation to areas with more favorable profiles, less racial separation is the predictable result.
On balance, my reading of the relevant literature is therefore
optimistic. By any metric, black segregation has fallen sharply
since 1970, and this decrease is backed fully by positive trends in
the forces that drive racial separation. What is more, there is no
reason why this progress should halt in the future. As Iceland
writes, “multiple forms of assimilation . . . [should] largely reduce
the significance of various color lines in metropolitan America.”145
However, it is important not to paint too rosy a picture. As I next

11 Du Bois Rev at 211, 217 (cited in note 14); Timberlake and Iceland, 6 City & Community
at 352 (cited in note 52).
140 See Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 100, 110 (cited in note 11);
Logan, Stults, and Farley, 41 Demography at 15, 16 (cited in note 138); Rugh and Massey,
11 Du Bois Rev at 217, 218 (cited in note 14); Timberlake and Iceland, 6 City & Community
at 352, 357 (cited in note 52).
141 See Jonathan T. Rothwell, Racial Enclaves and Density Zoning: The Institutionalized Segregation of Racial Minorities in the United States, 13 Am L & Econ Rev 290, 314,
347–48 (2011); Jonathan Rothwell and Douglas S. Massey, The Effect of Density Zoning
on Racial Segregation in U.S. Urban Areas, 44 Urban Affairs Rev 779, 780–82, 792 (2009);
Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 217, 219–23 (cited in note 14).
142 See notes 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing black migration patterns).
143 See Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 112 (cited in note 11).
144 Rothwell, 13 Am L & Econ Rev at 345 (cited in note 141). See also Rothwell and
Massey, 44 Urban Affairs Rev at 793 (cited in note 141).
145 Iceland, Where We Live Now at 104 (cited in note 53). See also Frey, Diversity Explosion at 176 (cited in note 11) (“[N]ew forces affecting black-white segregation are ushering in an era that will be quite different from the era of wholesale ghettoization of the
black population.”).
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discuss, American residential patterns remain troubling in several respects. These problems do not contradict the account I have
given so far, but they do cast a considerable shadow.
FIGURE 2. CAUSES OF SEGREGATION146

D. Caveats
The most critical caveat is that black segregation is still severe in numerous metropolitan areas, especially in the Midwest
and Northeast. According to the 2010 census, more than 70 percent of blacks would have to switch neighborhoods to achieve an
even black-white distribution in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit,
Miami, Milwaukee, Newark, New York City, Philadelphia, and
St. Louis.147 Another twelve areas have black-white dissimilarity
146 Turner, et al, Housing Discrimination against Racial and Ethnic Minorities at *68
(cited in note 15) (top graphs); Farley, 10 Contexts at 40 (cited in note 10) (bottom graph).
147 See Logan and Stults, The Persistence of Segregation at *6–7 (cited in note 40)
(covering only the fifty metropolitan areas with the largest black populations).
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scores above 60 percent (and so in the high zone).148 The scores in
these areas also are not improving as quickly as in the rest of the
country. As shown in Figure 3, which is taken from a study by
Iceland and his coauthors,149 black-white dissimilarity declined at
a markedly lower rate from 1970 to 2007 in the Midwest and
Northeast than in the South and West. These statistics mean that
far too many blacks continue to be trapped in highly segregated
communities rife with poverty and crime.150
A related point is that the gains in black integration are fragile; they may be reversed, or at least slowed, by economic setbacks. During the financial crisis of the late 2000s, for example,
foreclosure rates were almost four times as high in racially mixed
neighborhoods (8.6 percent) as in heavily white ones (2.3 percent).151 Many whites in mixed communities responded to the
housing market’s deterioration by moving to more homogeneously
white areas. As Professor Matthew Hall and his coauthors find,
the white population share in mixed neighborhoods dropped by
about 0.3 percentage points from 2000 to 2010 for every one-point
increase in the local foreclosure rate.152 A consequence of this
white exit was a rise of about 1 percentage point in the blackwhite dissimilarity index.153 That is, black segregation would have

148 See id. See also Glaeser and Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century at *11–26
(cited in note 11) (providing 2010 black-nonblack dissimilarity scores for all metropolitan
areas).
149 Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 107 (cited in note 11). See also
Rugh and Massey, 11 Du Bois Rev at 221 (cited in note 14) (showing very slow black-white
dissimilarity decline for the five most segregated metropolitan areas).
150 For a sampling of the vast literature documenting the ill effects of segregation, see
Massey and Denton, American Apartheid at 1–16, 115–216 (cited in note 3); Oliver, The
Paradoxes of Integration at 147 (cited in note 61); Charles, 29 Ann Rev Sociology at 197–
99 (cited in note 123); Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 107 J Polit Econ at 495–96 (cited in
note 66). Based on this literature, I assume here that integration is desirable and segregation is an evil to be avoided. But due to space constraints, I do not defend this assumption at any length.
151 See Matthew Hall, Kyle Crowder, and Amy Spring, Neighborhood Foreclosures,
Racial/Ethnic Transitions, and Residential Segregation, 80 Am Sociological Rev 526, 534
(2015). See also Jacob S. Rugh and Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 Am Sociological Rev 629, 639 (2010) (finding that the foreclosure rate was higher in metropolitan areas with higher black-white dissimilarity scores).
152 See Hall, Crowder, and Spring, 80 Am Sociological Rev at 536 (cited in note 151).
153 See id at 540 (finding in addition a rise of about 2 percent in the Hispanic-white
dissimilarity index).

STEPHANOPOULOS_ART_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Civil Rights in a Desegregating America

9/20/2016 2:00 PM

1357

fallen by roughly 1 percentage point more over the decade had the
financial crisis not struck.154
Another proviso has to do with the geographic level at which
integration is occurring. Blacks and whites living in tracts within
center cities and suburbs now are substantially less separated
than they were in earlier periods.155 But black-white segregation
between center cities and their surrounding suburbs, and from
one suburb to another, has stayed roughly constant.156 The main
driver of the country’s desegregative trend thus is greater blackwhite intermingling within individual municipalities. Racial separation at the inter- (as opposed to intra-) municipality level has
not declined noticeably.
Still another red flag is (largely) nonracial. Segregation along
socioeconomic lines, such as income, education, and profession,
has surged since 1970. Recent work by Professors Sean Reardon
and Kendra Bischoff, which also is displayed in Figure 3,157 makes
this point with respect to income. The rank-order entropy index,
which measures the extent to which tracts’ income distributions
diverge from that of the metropolitan area as a whole,158 increased
from about 12 percent in 1970 to about 16 percent in 2000.159 This

154 See id. See also Richard Rothstein, A Comment on Bank of America/Countrywide’s
Discriminatory Mortgage Lending and Its Implications for Racial Segregation *3 (Economic Policy Institute, Jan 23, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3SGL-4HRW (speculating that blacks whose homes were foreclosed may have had to “return to more racially
isolated and poorer ghettos,” thus also increasing black segregation).
155 See Fischer, et al, 41 Demography at 47 (cited in note 47) (providing data from
1960 to 2000); Daniel T. Lichter, Domenico Parisi, and Michael C. Taquino, Toward a New
Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segregation within and between Metropolitan Cities and
Suburbs, 80 Am Sociological Rev 843, 856 (2015) (providing data from 1990 to 2010).
156 See Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino, 80 Am Sociological Rev at 856 (cited in note 155).
Notably, Professors Daniel Lichter, Domenico Parisi, and Michael Taquino report a rise in
the share of total segregation explained by macro components, but the actual level of macro
segregation has remained about the same. See id.
157 Reardon and Bischoff, 116 Am J Sociology at 1117 (cited in note 42).
158 See id at 1110–14 (referring to this metric as “the rank-order information theory
index”).
159 See id at 1117. See also Sean F. Reardon and Kendra Bischoff, Growth in the Residential Segregation of Families by Income, 1970-2009 *16 (US2010 Project, Nov 2011),
archived at http://perma.cc/QW6W-WHKR (showing increases in the segregation of highand low-income families in large and moderately sized metropolitan areas from 1970 to
2009); Fischer, et al, 41 Demography at 50 (cited in note 47) (same for the period between
1960 and 2000); Douglas S. Massey, Jonathan Rothwell, and Thurston Domina, The
Changing Bases of Segregation in the United States, 626 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci
74, 82 (2009) (showing increases in the neighborhood sorting index and in poor-rich dissimilarity from 1970 to 2000).
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rise was propelled by growing income inequality,160 and it was the
wealthy who were most segregated from other income groups
throughout this period.161 Massey and his coauthors come to similar conclusions for education and profession. The dissimilarity
index between high school and college graduates increased from
roughly 20 percent in 1970 to roughly 35 percent in 2000.162 Dissimilarity between blue- and white-collar workers also rose from
about 12 percent in 1971 to about 17 percent in 1997.163
And there are two reasons why race is implicated here, too.
First, as Professor Rachel Dwyer shows, the rich and the poor are
more likely to be spatially separated in metropolitan areas that
have larger black populations and higher black-white dissimilarity scores.164 Black segregation appears to fuel income segregation. Second, as Figure 3 further illustrates, income segregation
within the black population is now higher, and has increased at a
faster rate, than intrawhite income segregation.165 This development may be attributable to the movement of middle- and upperincome blacks to suburban areas, away from the poorer blacks
remaining in inner cities.166 Whatever its cause, the rise in intrablack income segregation means that the rise in overall income
segregation is not due to growing income inequality alone. Race,
as ever, continues to be part of the story.
A final caveat is that while black-white separation is decreasing, no comparable progress is being made in many other areas.
The black-white gap in median household income has remained
roughly constant over the last fifty years.167 So has the black-white

160 See Reardon and Bischoff, 116 Am J Sociology at 1138 (cited in note 42) (concluding that “increasing income inequality was responsible for 40%–80% of the changes in
income segregation from 1970 to 2000”).
161 See id at 1120. See also Reardon and Bischoff, Growth in the Residential Segregation of Families by Income at *16 (cited in note 159); Fischer, et al, 41 Demography at 50
(cited in note 47).
162 See Massey, Rothwell, and Domina, 626 Annals Am Acad Polit & Soc Sci at 84
(cited in note 159) (calculating the index using tracts as subunits).
163 See id at 86 (calculating the index using congressional districts as subunits).
164 See Dwyer, 57 Soc Probs at 130–31 (cited in note 66). See also Richard Florida
and Charlotta Mellander, Segregated City: The Geography of Economic Segregation in
America’s Metros *19–20 (Martin Prosperity Institute, Feb 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/7GWC-MTB7 (finding that the wealthy are more segregated in metropolitan areas with higher black population shares).
165 See Reardon and Bischoff, 116 Am J Sociology at 1117 (cited in note 42).
166 See id at 1139.
167 See Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, and Jessica C. Smith, Income,
Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2011 *5 (US Census Bureau,
Sept 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/86XG-4868.
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difference in life expectancy.168 The gulf between black and white
incarceration rates has grown substantially since 1960.169 And as I
have found in earlier work, blacks remain politically powerless
relative to whites, at both the federal and state levels.170 These
statistics are highly troubling and call for both academic analysis
and policy change. But they are not the subject of this Article,
which is limited to housing patterns and their consequences.

168 See Jiaquan Xu, et al, Deaths: Final Data for 2007, 58 Natl Vital Stat Rep *1, 8
(May 20, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/R7FG-GPHJ.
169 See King’s Dream Remains an Elusive Goal; Many Americans See Racial Disparities *31 (Pew Research Center, Aug 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/U3DE-UNG4.
170 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 NYU L Rev 1527,
1580–94 (2015).
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FIGURE 3. CAVEATS ABOUT SEGREGATION171

***
The above discussion was so detailed because the phenomenon it described is so surprising to many legal observers. Given
America’s fraught racial history, black desegregation is not a
trend that can be asserted without extensive documentation.
From this point forward, though, I take as a given the decline in
black-white separation, and turn my attention from sociology to
law. My goal is to explore the implications of rising integration
171 Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake, 50 Demography at 107 (cited in note 11) (top
graph); Reardon and Bischoff, 116 Am J Sociology at 1117 (cited in note 42) (bottom graph).
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for the three civil rights domains most closely linked to racial
groups’ residential patterns: the Fair Housing Act, the Voting
Rights Act, and school desegregation law. For each area, I show
how it historically has depended on the existence of segregation,
how it is unsettled by desegregation, and how it might be reconsidered in a less racially separated society.
Two more points before continuing: First, it is true that other
civil rights statutes are related to residential patterns too. The
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977172 aims to prevent “redlining,” or discrimination in mortgage lending against minorityheavy areas.173 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964174 imposes
on school districts receiving federal funds some of the same obligations created by the Constitution.175 Title VII employment discrimination cases often consider how companies’ applicant pools
are shaped by racial segregation in the region.176 And so forth. In
my judgment, though, these ties are not as significant as the ones
of the areas I address. These areas also seem like more than
enough ground for a single article to cover.
Second, because the legal literature has neither traced the
links between civil rights law and segregation nor noticed the
trend toward desegregation, I rely primarily on court decisions
below. These decisions, by the Supreme Court as well as lower
tribunals, dramatize how closely the doctrine is connected to racial groups’ residential patterns. They illustrate the many ways
in which segregation traditionally has assisted plaintiffs—and in
which integration increasingly benefits defendants. Of course, the
decisions I highlight are not chosen at random. But even though
they are not a representative sample, they still demonstrate that
race and place are crucial building blocks of the civil rights edifice.

172

Pub L No 95-128, 91 Stat 1147, codified at 12 USC § 2901 et seq.
See 91 Stat at 1147, codified at 12 USC § 2901(a)(1) (requiring banks “by law to
demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business”).
174 Pub L No 88-352, 78 Stat 241, codified as amended at 42 USC § 2000a et seq.
175 See 78 Stat at 252, codified at 42 USC § 2000d (“No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
176 See, for example, Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio, 490 US 642, 647–48 (1989)
(linking “racial stratification of the work force” to “racially segregated housing”).
173

STEPHANOPOULOS_ART_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

1362

The University of Chicago Law Review

9/20/2016 2:00 PM

[83:1329

II. FAIR HOUSING ACT
The Fair Housing Act is the logical law with which to begin.
Residential segregation and integration are, at their core, properties of people’s housing, and it is the FHA that deals most directly
with the racial aspects of the housing market. In this Part, I first
identify the various ways in which segregation historically has
facilitated the imposition of liability and aggressive remedies under the FHA. It has given rise to standing; supported findings of
disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to further integration affirmatively; and justified far-reaching remedial
measures.
Next, I argue that all of these pillars of FHA doctrine are
shaken by desegregation. Standing is harder to establish in stably
integrated areas. Actors in these areas also often cannot be held
liable on any theory, whether based on intent, effect, or effort.
And potent remedies are both less necessary and more likely to
be deemed unlawful. Lastly, I offer a sketch of how the FHA might
operate in a more integrated future environment. The statute’s
desegregative components might go into a kind of remission, remaining available in theory but seldom being used successfully in
practice. But its antidiscrimination177 provisions would remain
(almost) as vital as ever.
A.

Connection

The FHA prohibits an array of housing-related actions from
being taken “because of race [or] color.”178 Among other things,
parties cannot “refuse to sell or rent,”179 “discriminate . . . in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental,”180 “represent . . .
that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental,”181
or “otherwise make unavailable or deny[ ] a dwelling”182 on racial
grounds. The FHA also announces that “[i]t is the policy of the
United States to provide . . . for fair housing throughout the

177 To be clear about terms, I am distinguishing “discrimination” from “segregation”
here, not from “disparate impact.” Both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims
can proceed under both antidiscrimination and desegregation theories.
178 42 USC §§ 3604–06.
179 42 USC § 3604(a).
180 42 USC § 3604(b).
181 42 USC § 3604(d).
182 42 USC § 3604(a).
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[country],”183 and requires all federal agencies involved in administering the law “affirmatively to further [its] purposes.”184
Like most causes of action, the FHA can be divided into three
topics: standing, liability, and remedy. In turn—and as recently
confirmed by the Supreme Court185—liability under the statute
can come about in three ways: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to further the law’s purposes affirmatively. As I
explain below, the segregated residential patterns that persisted
for much of the FHA’s history (and that still persist in several
metropolitan areas today) made all of these elements easier to
prove. If not quite indispensable, segregation at least was highly
conducive to the success of certain plaintiffs’ claims.186
Start with standing to file suit. In a trio of early decisions,
the Court held that plaintiffs have standing if they live in areas
that are segregated, or threaten to become segregated, because of
defendants’ actions. In a 1972 case, the claimants were tenants in
a San Francisco apartment complex that was almost all-white
due to the landlord’s discrimination against nonwhite applicants.187 The Court agreed that the claimants had been injured by
“los[ing] the social benefits of living in an integrated community”
and “being ‘stigmatized’ as residents of a ‘white ghetto.’” 188 Likewise, in cases from 1979 and 1982, the plaintiffs lived in mixed
neighborhoods within the Chicago and Richmond metropolitan
areas, respectively, that were segregating due to racial steering
by realtors.189 Here too the plaintiffs were harmed because the
“transformation of their neighborhood from an integrated to a
predominantly Negro community [ ] depriv[ed] them of ‘the social
and professional benefits of living in an integrated society.’” 190

183

42 USC § 3601.
42 USC § 3608(d).
185 See Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v Inclusive Communities Project, Inc, 135 S Ct 2507, 2525–26 (2015) (holding that a disparate impact theory is
cognizable under the FHA).
186 Note that I cover only those elements of FHA (and VRA and school desegregation)
doctrine that are linked to racial groups’ residential patterns. I do not discuss the numerous doctrinal elements that are unrelated to segregation or integration.
187 See Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 206–07 (1972).
188 Id at 208.
189 See Gladstone, Realtors v Village of Bellwood, 441 US 91, 93, 109–10 (1979) (noting allegations that steering “is affecting the village’s racial composition, replacing what
is presently an integrated neighborhood with a segregated one”); Havens Realty Corp v
Coleman, 455 US 363, 376 (1982).
190 Gladstone, 441 US at 111. See also Havens, 455 US at 376.
184
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Importantly, the Court based its conclusion that standing follows from segregation on its understanding of the FHA’s purposes. The Court observed in the 1972 case that the law does not
only target “discriminatory housing practices.”191 Rather, it also
aims to “replace the ghettos ‘by truly integrated and balanced living patterns,’” as the FHA’s architect, Senator Walter Mondale,
put it.192 Other legislative history confirms the statute’s dual goals
of antidiscrimination and desegregation. One key congressman
stated that the FHA would combat the “blight of segregated housing and the pale of the ghetto.”193 Another commented that the
law would help “achieve the aim of an integrated society.”194 These
remarks provide context for the Court’s position that plaintiffs in
segregated (or segregating) areas suffer a cognizable injury. Even
if they are not subjected to discrimination, they are victims of another ill that the FHA seeks to cure.
Next consider theories of liability under the FHA, the first
(and most common195) of which is invidious intent demonstrated
by disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals. Evidence that segregation is high in an area, in part because of a
defendant’s actions, does not prove that the defendant had a discriminatory or segregative motive. But as courts often have recognized, it is strong circumstantial support for the proposition.
For instance, almost all of Yonkers’s minority residents lived in
its southwest quadrant in the 1980s, and its other neighborhoods
were almost entirely white.196 This pattern had several causes,
one of which was the city’s policy, followed for nearly half a century, of placing essentially all public housing units in the same

191

Trafficante, 409 US at 211.
Id, quoting 1968 Civil Rights Act Senate Debate, 90th Cong, 2d Sess at 3422 (cited
in note 38) (statement of Sen Mondale). See also Inclusive Communities, 135 S Ct at 2525–
26 (“The Court acknowledges the Fair Housing Act’s continuing role in moving the Nation
toward a more integrated society.”).
193 90th Cong, 2d Sess, in 114 Cong Rec 9559 (Apr 10, 1968) (“1968 Civil Rights Act
House Debate”) (statement of Rep Celler).
194 Id at 9591 (statement of Rep Ryan). See also Schwemm, Housing Discrimination
§ 2:3 at 2-10 (cited in note 6) (“This legislative history makes clear that residential integration is a major goal of the Fair Housing Act, separate and independent of the goal of
expanding minority housing opportunities.”); HUD, Implementation of the Fair Housing
Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed Reg 11460, 11469 (2013) (“[T]he elimination
of segregation is central to why the Fair Housing Act was enacted.”).
195 See Schwemm, Housing Discrimination § 10:2 at 10-6 (cited in note 6) (noting that
disparate treatment claims “account for most of the litigation under the Fair Housing Act”).
196 See United States v Yonkers Board of Education, 837 F2d 1181, 1219 (2d Cir 1987)
(citing census statistics about segregation in Yonkers).
192
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minority-heavy zone.197 This combination of severe racial separation and a “pattern and practice of confining subsidized housing
to Southwest Yonkers” convinced the Second Circuit that the city
“had intentionally enhanced racial segregation.”198
Illicit intent was inferred from segregation on even starker
facts in a 1980 case involving Parma, a suburb of Cleveland.
Parma was “virtually all-white”199 in this era, while “[a]n extreme
condition of racial segregation exist[ed] in the Cleveland metropolitan area.”200 Parma maintained its racial homogeneity
through “opposition to any form of public or low-income housing,”
as well as strict zoning regulations and the “creation of [an] image
of racial exclusion” by the town’s political leaders.201 Faced with
this evidence, the court concluded, “These actions . . . are evidence
of a segregative intent. They had a segregative effect which was
not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen.”202
A second FHA theory is disparate impact—and one of the
ways it may be shown, in the words of a recent HUD regulation,
is that “[a] practice . . . creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns.”203 The link between racial separation and liability could not be clearer here. Segregation itself,
as long as it is partly attributable to the challenged practice, represents a prima facie case of an FHA violation.204 One type of policy that numerous plaintiffs have challenged successfully on this

197

See id at 1186–93 (recounting Yonkers’s housing decisions from the 1940s to the

1980s).
198 Id at 1184. See also id at 1222 (concluding that given “the impact of the City’s
decisions,” Yonkers’s claim that there was insufficient evidence of “a segregative purpose”
was “frivolous”).
199 United States v City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F Supp 1049, 1056 (ND Ohio 1980).
200 Id at 1055. See also id at 1055–65 (discussing the levels and causes of segregation
in the Cleveland area).
201 Id at 1066, 1072. See also id at 1065–94 (discussing Parma’s racially exclusionary
policies).
202 Id at 1097. For other examples of segregation helping to establish discriminatory
intent, see Zuch v Hussey, 394 F Supp 1028, 1054 (ED Mich 1975) (involving racial steering by realtors in the Detroit metropolitan area); Kennedy Park Homes Association v City
of Lackawanna, 318 F Supp 669, 695 (WDNY 1970) (involving a Buffalo suburb’s refusal
to approve low-income housing). See also Valerie Schneider, In Defense of Disparate Impact: Urban Redevelopment and the Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in the Fair Housing
Act, 79 Mo L Rev 539, 566 (2014) (“[D]isparate impact evidence can be properly used to
help prove disparate treatment claims.”) (emphasis omitted).
203 24 CFR § 100.500(a). See also Schwemm, Housing Discrimination § 13:12 at 1341 (cited in note 6) (noting that disparate impact liability arises when “the defendant’s
action . . . perpetuate[s] residential segregation in an area”).
204 The circuits differ in exactly what doctrinal steps follow after a plaintiff has established that a defendant’s practice perpetuates segregation. See Inclusive Communities
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basis is a zoning restriction that prevents low-income developments (which would be attractive to minorities) from being built
in a heavily white area.205 For example, Sunnyvale, an almost allwhite suburb of Dallas, banned apartments outright and imposed
a one-acre requirement for homes in the 1990s.206 These policies
caused Sunnyvale’s housing to be unaffordable for most minorities, thus “perpetuat[ing] segregation in a town that is 97 percent
white” and breaching the FHA.207
Another practice that frequently has been deemed unlawful
because of its segregative effect is the restriction of public housing
to minority-heavy neighborhoods.208 If minorities apply to live in
the public housing in disproportionate numbers (as is usually the
case), then its siting worsens, or at least does not improve, existing segregation. My home city of Chicago aptly illustrates this
scenario of public housing placement giving rise to liability. In
litigation that spanned decades209 and was memorialized in a
well-known book,210 it emerged that “substantially all of the sites
for family public housing selected by [the Chicago Housing Authority] . . . were . . . located ‘within the areas known as the Negro
Project, Inc v Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, 747 F3d 275, 281 (5th
Cir 2014) (listing various judicial approaches). A 2013 HUD rule recommends that, after
a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, (1) the “defendant has the burden of proving that
the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests,” and then (2) if this burden is met, the “plaintiff may still prevail
upon proving that the . . . interests supporting the challenged practice could be served by
another practice that has a less discriminatory effect.” 24 CFR § 100.500(c)(2)–(3). The
Supreme Court recently referred favorably to this framework. See Inclusive Communities,
135 S Ct at 2514–15, 2522–23.
205 For other examples of zoning restrictions leading to disparate impact liability, see
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp v Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F2d 1283,
1290–91 (7th Cir 1977) (involving the perpetuation of segregation due to a Chicago suburb’s refusal to rezone to allow construction of low-income housing); United States v City
of Black Jack, Missouri, 508 F2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir 1974) (involving similar perpetuation
due to a St. Louis suburb’s adoption of a zoning ordinance). See also Inclusive Communities, 135 S Ct at 2522 (referring to such cases as “the heartland of disparate-impact liability”).
206 See Dews v Town of Sunnyvale, Texas, 109 F Supp 2d 526, 529 (ND Tex 2000).
207 Id at 568–69.
208 For other examples of public housing placement leading to disparate impact liability, see King v Harris, 464 F Supp 827, 835 (EDNY 1979) (holding that new public housing in a Staten Island neighborhood near the community’s racial tipping point “will insure
the ghettoization of the area”), vacd Faymor Development Co v King, 446 US 905 (1980);
Blackshear Residents Organization v Housing Authority of City of Austin, 347 F Supp
1138, 1141 (WD Tex 1971) (describing how public housing units in black, Hispanic, and
white areas of Austin had racial majorities corresponding to their locations).
209 The culmination of the litigation was the Supreme Court’s decision in Hills v
Gautreaux, 425 US 284 (1976).
210 See generally Alexander Polikoff, Waiting for Gautreaux: A Story of Segregation,
Housing, and the Black Ghetto (Northwestern 2006).
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Ghetto.’” 211 The Supreme Court not only upheld the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the law had been violated, but also sustained
its order granting sweeping, metropolitan area–wide relief.212
A third FHA theory is that a federal agency (typically HUD)
has failed “affirmatively to further the [statute’s] purposes.”213
Since integration is one of these purposes, liability may follow
from persistent segregation that the government has not tried
sufficiently to reduce.214 A high-profile case of inadequate desegregative effort arose in the 2000s in the Baltimore metropolitan
area, where most blacks live in the city and most whites live in
the adjoining county.215 Throughout the 1990s, HUD located public housing units almost exclusively in the city and distributed
Section 8 vouchers that also were used primarily within the city
limits.216 HUD’s failure to consider regional responses to segregation amounted to a lack of affirmative furtherance of the FHA’s
goals.217 As the court concluded, “It is high time that HUD live up
to its statutory mandate . . . and thus consider regional approaches to promoting fair housing opportunities.”218
Lastly, with respect to remedies, severe segregation has justified aggressive policy responses by both courts and local governments.219 Bold steps that otherwise might have raised legal hackles have been countenanced as the only way to achieve
integration. The courts’ orders that hundreds of public housing
units be built in heavily white neighborhoods in Yonkers,220 and
211

Gautreaux, 425 US at 286.
See id at 306.
213 42 USC § 3608(d). See also generally HUD, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80 Fed Reg 42272 (2015) (announcing a new HUD regulation specifying local jurisdictions’ responsibilities for promoting integration).
214 For other examples of inadequate integrative effort leading to liability, see
N.A.A.C.P. v Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 817 F2d 149, 156 (1st Cir
1987) (describing HUD as taking an “overly narrow” view of its own duties and not pursuing desegregation with sufficient vigor in the Boston metropolitan area); Shannon v
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 436 F2d 809, 819–22 (3d
Cir 1970) (noting similar conduct by HUD in the Philadelphia metropolitan area). Section 3608(d) itself does not create a private right of action; rather, it enables claims under
the Administrative Procedure Act alleging that a federal agency has behaved arbitrarily
or capriciously. See N.A.A.C.P., 817 F2d at 157–60.
215 See Thompson v United States Department of Housing and Urban Development,
348 F Supp 2d 398, 406 (D Md 2005).
216 See id at 459–60.
217 See id at 458–64.
218 Id at 463.
219 Such forceful measures have been quite rare, though, undertaken in only a small
subset of the country’s highly segregated areas.
220 See Yonkers, 837 F2d at 1184.
212
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that thousands of black families be given Section 8 vouchers in
order to move to heavily white Chicago suburbs,221 are good examples of forceful judicial intervention. Both orders were upheld on
appeal,222 even though they relied explicitly on race in an era in
which such means were disfavored.
At the local government level, probably the most famous case
of an unorthodox remedy being imposed (and then sustained) is
the New York City Housing Authority’s decision in the 1970s to
limit the share of minority residents in a Lower East Side public
housing development.223 The Authority worried that, without this
occupancy quota, the development would become “a non-white
‘pocket ghetto’” that would induce “white residents to take flight,”
thus “leading eventually to non-white ghettoization of the community.”224 The Second Circuit approved the quota, reasoning
that the Authority’s “obligation to act affirmatively to achieve integration” outweighed the harm of “prevent[ing] some members
of a racial minority from residing in publicly assisted housing.”225
To avoid exceeding the local tipping point, that is, desegregation
took priority over antidiscrimination.
Given that integration is one of the FHA’s fundamental goals,
it may not be surprising that the statute is intertwined so tightly
with racial groups’ residential patterns. The extent of these ties,
though, has not been grasped previously. At every stage in an
FHA case—standing, liability, and remedy—the existence of segregation makes it markedly easier for certain plaintiffs to satisfy
their burdens. More importantly, as I argue next, rising integration has the opposite effects. It causes each FHA element to become considerably more difficult to establish. This thesis already
is more than conjecture, as the ensuing cases illustrate. And the
problems for FHA claimants posed by desegregation only can be
expected to intensify as racial separation continues to decline.

221 See Gautreaux v Pierce, 690 F2d 616, 638 (7th Cir 1982) (approving a consent decree); Gautreaux v Landrieu, 523 F Supp 665, 672 (ND Ill 1981) (same).
222 See notes 220–21.
223 See Otero v New York City Housing Authority, 484 F2d 1122, 1128 (2d Cir 1973)
(describing actions taken by the Authority to achieve a 60 percent white, 40 percent
nonwhite resident makeup at a development). These actions were not taken in response
to FHA litigation; rather, they are what prompted the (unsuccessful) suit. For another
New York City example of a racial occupancy quota being upheld when necessary to prevent tipping, see Daubner v Harris, 514 F Supp 856, 868 (SDNY 1981) (approving such a
policy at a Chelsea public housing development).
224 Otero, 484 F2d at 1124.
225 Id at 1133–34.
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Complication

Start again with standing. Just as it is a cognizable injury to
live in a neighborhood that is segregated (or segregating) because
of a defendant’s actions, a plaintiff who lives in a stably integrated
area has not been harmed. She has not been deprived (nor faces
any risk of deprivation) of the “social and professional benefits”
that come from interracial contact.226 For instance, the northern
half of the Upper West Side was one of New York City’s few integrated communities in the 1980s.227 It was just over 60 percent
white in this period, a level largely unchanged from earlier decades.228 In litigation challenging a proposed luxury development
on FHA grounds, the court therefore held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing. “[I]t is clear that plaintiffs have not suffered any
loss of associational benefits. Indeed, their opportunities to derive
the benefits of living in an integrated neighborhood have increased over the years.”229
Similarly, Cleveland Heights is a Cleveland suburb that (unlike Parma) implemented several policies in the 1970s to promote
integration.230 As a result, it remained a “racially integrated community” with a population that was roughly 75 percent white and
25 percent black.231 In a lawsuit alleging racial steering by the
town, the trial court ruled that a minority plaintiff who resided in
Cleveland Heights did not have standing. “[H]e has not lost any
of the social benefits of interracial living in his neighborhood.
Hence, he is prevented from establishing standing.”232
Next take the disparate treatment theory of FHA liability. In
the same way that segregated residential patterns support an inference of invidious intent, integrated patterns suggest the opposite conclusion. A defendant in an integrated area certainly could
226

Gladstone, 441 US at 111.
See Strykers Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc v City of New York, 695 F Supp 1531,
1542 (SDNY 1988) (citing census statistics “show[ing] that the renewal area historically
has been a well integrated neighborhood and has become more integrated over time”).
228 See id.
229 Id.
230 See Smith v City of Cleveland Heights, 760 F2d 720, 721 (6th Cir 1985) (describing the city’s policies of maintaining integration by “steering white home buyers to the
Cleveland Heights housing market and black home buyers away from the area”).
231 Id.
232 Id at 725 (Wellford dissenting) (quotation marks omitted). On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that the plaintiff had standing because Cleveland Heights’s “steering policies
stigmatize him as an inferior member of the community.” Id at 722. The majority noted
the plaintiff’s associational argument for standing, and then explicitly declined to address
it. Id at 724–25.
227
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aim to discriminate or to segregate—but these motives are both
less likely and harder to prove in the absence of racial separation.
A recent case from Joliet, a suburb of Chicago, highlights the obstacles that integration presents for disparate treatment claims.
Joliet is a “very diverse city,” about 53 percent white, 28 percent
Hispanic, and 16 percent black as of the 2010 census.233 In the
mid-2000s, Joliet decided to use its eminent domain power to acquire, and then close, a large low-income development occupied
mostly by minorities.234 Because the dislocated tenants were expected to remain in the city, the development’s closure was predicted to improve (or at least not worsen) existing integration.235
The court thus decided that “this circumstantial evidence . . . cannot support the conclusion that Joliet possesses a discriminatory
intent.”236
Likewise, University Oaks is a neighborhood of Houston that,
in the 1980s, was “highly integrated with [a] minority population
estimated at nearly 50% of the residents.”237 The area’s homeowners voted to renew property deeds that contained restrictive racial
covenants entered into half a century earlier.238 In an FHA suit
brought by the DOJ, the court relied on the “present composition
of the community” to hold that the homeowners “had no intent
whatsoever to discriminate on the basis of race.”239 The community’s status as an “integrated model community” offset the more
negative deductions about intent that followed from the covenants’ extension.240
The impact of integration on the disparate impact theory of
FHA liability is even starker. If residential patterns are integrated
and likely to remain so, then it is very difficult for segregation to

233

City of Joliet v Mid-City National Bank of Chicago, 2014 WL 4667254, *23 (ND Ill).
See id at *4–9.
235 See id at *23 (noting that “the relocation of 240 [development] families . . . cannot
be reasonably believed to affect the overall demographics of Joliet”).
236 Id. See also id at *17 (“[T]he demographic statistics presented by the parties is conclusive evidence that Joliet does not intend to discriminate against African-Americans.”).
237 United States v University Oaks Civic Club, 653 F Supp 1469, 1471 (SD Tex 1987).
238 See id at 1472. However, the homeowners also took steps to reduce the covenants’
effects. See id.
239 Id at 1473.
240 Id. See also id at 1475 (commenting that “a highly integrated community . . . is
hardly characteristic of the perpetrators of discrimination that the Fair Housing Act has
focused upon”). For another example of integration militating against a finding of invidious intent, see Heights Community Congress v Hilltop Realty, Inc, 774 F2d 135, 143 (6th
Cir 1985) (finding that a realtor lacked segregative motive when he circulated solicitation
cards to homeowners in a “transitional” neighborhood in Cleveland Heights).
234
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be “create[d], increase[d], reinforce[d], or perpetuate[d].”241 The
basic prerequisite for this kind of FHA violation—a practice that
maintains or worsens existing segregation—is absent. Recall from
earlier that a disparate impact typically is found when a municipality either uses zoning to prevent low-income developments from
being built or restricts public housing to minority-heavy areas.242
Neither of these scenarios is plausible in the face of integration.
For example, in a recent case from Fulton County, a suburban region near Atlanta, the plaintiffs challenged the county’s
refusal to rezone property where they hoped to construct a lowincome development.243 This property was “in a tract with 54%
black population” that bordered another tract that was 42 percent
black.244 The court denied the claim, reasoning that “[i]n the absence of the [proposed] development the South Fulton County
area likely will remain a racially mixed, predominantly African
American area, just as it was previously.”245 Similarly, in a case
from the 1990s, the plaintiffs complained about the location and
volume of public housing in Islip, a suburb of New York City.246
Islip was integrating rapidly in this period, with the share of its
black population living in heavily black tracts falling from 91 percent to 69 percent over a decade.247 This integrative trend helped
convince the court that “[t]he evidence presented with regard to
the Town’s housing policies . . . fail[s] to establish any segregative
effect.”248

241 24 CFR § 100.500(a). The case law has not yet confronted practices that increase
segregation, but are undertaken in areas that are largely integrated. When disputes involving such practices emerge, courts will have to decide if all segregative practices are
presumptively unlawful, or only those adopted in segregated areas.
242 See notes 205–12 and accompanying text.
243 See Hallmark Developers, Inc v Fulton County, Georgia, 386 F Supp 2d 1369,
1372–80 (ND Ga 2005).
244 Id at 1371–72.
245 Id at 1383. See also Hallmark Developers, Inc v Fulton County, Georgia, 466 F3d
1276, 1288 (11th Cir 2006) (“[T]here is no evidence that South Fulton is currently segregated and that Hallmark’s development would end that segregation.”).
246 See Suffolk Housing Services v Town of Islip, New York, 1996 WL 75282, *2–9 (EDNY).
247 See id at *1.
248 Id at *12. The court also noted that some of the public housing erected by Islip had
an “integrative effect.” Id at *13. Two more examples of disparate impact claims failing in
integrated areas come from the Upper West Side of New York City. See Strykers Bay
Neighborhood Council, 695 F Supp at 1542 (rejecting a disparate impact claim against a
proposed luxury development); Trinity Episcopal School Corp v Romney, 387 F Supp 1044,
1073 (SDNY 1974) (rejecting a similar claim against a proposed low-income development).
And Artisan/American Corp v City of Alvin, Texas, 588 F3d 291 (5th Cir 2009), is a case
remarkably similar to Hallmark, with the court rejecting a disparate impact challenge to
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Lastly, as to remedies, integration reduces both the need for
aggressive measures by courts and municipalities and the likelihood that they will be upheld in litigation. The best evidence of
reduced need is indirect. There are very few cases in recent years
of courts granting relief on the scale of the 1980s Yonkers and
Chicago orders, which led to thousands of black families moving
to white areas at public expense.249 There also are “virtually no
new [public housing quotas] . . . in this period and thus litigation
involving such programs has ceased.”250 The only reason for these
quotas was to prevent neighborhoods from tipping.251 As the danger
of tipping has receded, so has the impetus to adopt these policies.
The legal vulnerability of forceful remedies is illustrated
nicely, in the context of a court order, by a Dallas case from the
1990s. Like the Yonkers and Chicago courts, the Dallas court held
that the local housing authority had perpetuated segregation by
restricting public housing to minority-heavy areas.252 Also like
those courts, it then instructed the authority to build thousands
of new public housing units in white neighborhoods.253 But on appeal, this order was deemed a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Because Dallas was desegregating, thanks in part to the
“relative success of [the authority] in moving blacks into predominantly white areas via its Section 8 program,” the “district
court’s race-conscious site selection criterion” was not “necessary
to remedy the effects of past discrimination.”254

a city’s denial of a permit for a low-income development due to lack of “evidence that minorities lived in particular areas of town, or that the project would exacerbate such a trend,
if it existed.” Id at 299 n 20.
249 See notes 220–21 and accompanying text. As discussed below, one similarly aggressive court order, in Dallas in the 1990s, was declared unlawful on appeal. See notes
252–54 and accompanying text.
250 Schwemm, Housing Discrimination § 11A:2 at 11A-17 (cited in note 6).
251 See Rodney A. Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and
Goals in the 1980’s, 58 S Cal L Rev 947, 989 (1985) (“The only reason that racial occupancy
controls are needed is that without them too many whites . . . find themselves overwhelmed by fear and bias when faced with . . . substantial numbers of black neighbors.”).
252 See Walker v City of Mesquite, TX, 169 F3d 973, 976 (5th Cir 1999) (“The history
of public housing in Dallas is a sordid tale of overt and covert racial discrimination and
segregation.”).
253 See id at 977 (describing the court order).
254 Id at 984. See also id (noting that “the number of Section 8 black families living in
predominantly white areas increased by . . . 27%” in “the two year period between 1994
and 1996”).
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Analogously, courts in the 1980s struck down racial occupancy quotas used by public housing developments in Charlottesville, New York City, and Pittsburgh.255 The problem with
all of these policies was the same. In areas that were integrating,
slowly but surely, there was insufficient evidence that the quotas
were necessary to prevent tipping. As the court observed in the
Pittsburgh case, the development had remained “located in an integrated section” even as “the percentage of minority occupancy
in the [development] had increased.”256 The housing authority
thus was unable to prove that “existing integration . . . would be
destroyed absent a restriction on the number of minorities permitted to reside in public housing.”257
But while it is clear that integration complicates several aspects of FHA doctrine, two caveats should be noted here. First,
integration has little bearing on claims that are based on discrimination rather than segregation. It is perfectly possible for landlords, realtors, housing authorities, and other parties to discriminate in housing transactions even as residential patterns become
less racially separated.258 And second, the case for the disruptive
effects of integration is stronger in theory than in practice (at
least to date). Compared to the many instances in which segregation has facilitated the imposition of liability and potent remedies, the number of suits in which integration has had the opposite consequences remains modest.259
How come? The most likely explanation is that the national
decline in segregation is too recent (and too geographically uneven) to have manifested itself fully in the FHA case law. Until not
255 See United States v Charlottesville Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 718 F
Supp 461, 471 (WD Va 1989) (invalidating a Charlottesville quota on FHA grounds);
United States v Starrett City Associates, 660 F Supp 668, 679 (EDNY 1987) (invalidating
a New York City quota on FHA grounds); Burney v Housing Authority of County of Beaver,
551 F Supp 746, 767–70 (WD Pa 1982) (invaliding a Pittsburgh quota on constitutional
and FHA grounds).
256 Burney, 551 F Supp at 766 (quotation marks omitted).
257 Id at 765. See also Charlottesville, 718 F Supp at 466 n 8 (“[The Charlottesville
Redevelopment and Housing Authority] has not demonstrated that a [tipping] demographic similar[ ] to the situation in Otero exists in the instant matter.”); Starrett City,
660 F Supp at 678 (noting the “wide elasticity of [tipping], which ranged ‘from a low of 1%
black to a high of 60% black’”).
258 But see Galster, 2 J Housing Rsrch at 113 (cited in note 113) (finding that levels
of housing discrimination and segregation are linked, and thus implying that there may
be less discrimination if segregation is lower).
259 Notably, I am unaware of any affirmative furtherance claims under 42 USC
§ 3608(d) that have failed on the ground that desegregating residential patterns show that
HUD has pursued integration with sufficient vigor.
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long ago (and to this day in several metropolitan areas), segregation was not low enough to be a hindrance rather than a boon for
plaintiffs. Another possibility is that FHA suits are filed at higher
rates in segregated areas than in integrated ones.260 Self-selection
of this sort could cause the courts’ perception of American residential patterns to diverge from the empirical reality.
But whatever the reason for the relatively low volume of FHA
cases grappling with desegregation, the key points here are conceptual and prospective. Desegregation does make it harder for
plaintiffs to show standing, to establish liability, and to win
sweeping remedies. And these obstacles are likely to loom larger
in the future, as the country continues to integrate. Below, I discuss what these points mean for the FHA as a whole. My view is
that they may prompt the statute’s reorientation from desegregation to antidiscrimination—and that this shift in focus would be,
for the most part, desirable.
C.

Conciliation

I begin on the bright side. If the elements of a cause of action
aimed at bringing about “integrated and balanced living patterns”261 are now trickier to prove—because these patterns are
now more prevalent—then congratulations are in order for a significant civil rights victory. The growing problems faced by certain FHA plaintiffs are a sign that one of the statute’s key objectives, desegregation, is closer to being achieved. Diminished
activity, heading eventually toward dormancy, is exactly what we
should want for provisions combating an evil that gradually is
fading from the American residential landscape.
This optimism extends to the FHA’s antidiscrimination project. As discussed earlier, discrimination is a major driver of segregation because it can prevent minorities from being able to live
in their preferred neighborhoods.262 The available evidence also
indicates that discrimination is decreasing, and so helping to propel the decline in segregation.263 Under these conditions, we might
expect (and applaud) a lower frequency of, and success rate for,
260 I am unaware of any comprehensive data on the geographic distribution of FHA
cases. However, the country’s fair housing organizations, which bring many FHA claims,
are concentrated in more segregated areas. See State and Local Fair Housing Enforcement
Agencies (The Leadership Conference, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/3CWH-9ZZ7.
261 Trafficante, 409 US at 211.
262 See notes 100–02 and accompanying text.
263 See notes 103–15 and accompanying text.
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housing discrimination claims. And indeed, this seems to be what
is happening. Professor Michael Schill reports that “blatant forms
of discrimination are becoming less common” in complaints filed
with HUD.264 Likewise, Professor Stacy Seicshnaydre finds that
plaintiffs’ odds of winning FHA appeals fell from 100 percent in
the 1970s to 47 percent in the 1980s, 13 percent in the 1990s, and
only 8 percent in the 2000s.265 This trend could reflect changing
judicial attitudes, but it also could signify that the FHA’s other
bête noire is becoming rarer too.266
However, there remain reasons for wariness even in light of
this encouraging picture. With respect to the FHA’s desegregative
side, it would not be impossible for segregation levels to rise in
coming years, say if another economic crisis were to destabilize
integrating neighborhoods.267 This sort of shock would raise the
profile of doctrinal elements linked to segregation and make them
easier for plaintiffs to establish.268 In addition, even in a generally
integrating society, specific actions may well be taken with segregative intent or have a segregative effect. The law should remain
watchful for these actions, not overlooking them due to the overall
rise in integration.
The need for vigilance is even greater with respect to the
FHA’s antidiscrimination half. Housing discrimination may be
declining, and it may no longer be the main determinant of racial
groups’ residential patterns, but it still occurs far too often. Notably, the most recent HUD survey concluded that about 9 percent
of black renters and 13 percent of black homebuyers are told
about fewer available units than their white peers.269 Roughly 3
percent of black renters and 9 percent of black homebuyers also
264 Michael H. Schill, Implementing the Federal Fair Housing Act: The Adjudication
of Complaints, in Goering, ed, Fragile Rights within Cities 143, 152 (cited in note 77).
265 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate
Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims under the Fair Housing Act, 63 Am U
L Rev 357, 393–94 (2013) (surveying appellate FHA cases involving disparate impact
claims).
266 See Richard H. Sander, Housing Segregation and Housing Integration: The Diverging Paths of Urban America, 52 U Miami L Rev 977, 1009 (1998) (concluding that the FHA
“was, at least, partly successful in its principal goal of attacking market discrimination”).
267 See notes 151–54 and accompanying text (discussing how the foreclosure crisis of
the late 2000s modestly increased segregation).
268 See, for example, John P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of
the Fair Housing Act, 41 Ind L Rev 629, 638–47 (2008) (explaining how the FHA was
used in one case to challenge reverse redlining practices that led to high foreclosure rates
in minority-heavy areas in the late 2000s).
269 See Turner, et al, Housing Discrimination against Racial and Ethnic Minorities
at *40, 51 (cited in note 15).
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are shown fewer units.270 These rates are substantially lower than
in earlier eras, but they still imply that hundreds of thousands of
FHA violations take place each year.271 The struggle against discrimination clearly has not yet been won.
This analysis suggests that the FHA may operate somewhat
differently in the future than it has to date. Historically, many
landmark cases involved desegregation in some capacity. The Supreme Court’s leading encounters with the statute addressed
standing in segregated areas and disparate impact claims based
on the furtherance of segregation.272 In the lower courts too, “the
more common type” of disparate impact decision dealt with “exclusionary zoning . . . challenged on the ground that it perpetuates housing segregation.”273 By contrast, antidiscrimination
cases, while abundant, were relatively small-bore.274 They implicated fewer parties, had less dramatic consequences, and did not
set off the same judicial fireworks.275
Going forward, though, antidiscrimination is likely to be
where the action is. In a more integrated environment, segregation should not be as grave of a concern, and there should not be
as much for the FHA’s desegregative provisions to do. These provisions still should have some utility, serving as a prophylactic in
case segregation rises again as well as a weapon against lingering
segregative practices. But their potency may well be lower than
in previous periods. On the other hand, even in an integrating society, housing discrimination probably will persist at levels necessitating substantial litigation. Landlords will continue refusing to

270

See id.
See id at *68 (showing a decline in housing discrimination since 1977). See also
Schwemm, Housing Discrimination § 11A:1 at 11A-6 (cited in note 6) (noting that “housing
providers—particularly landlords—continue to violate [the FHA] at an astonishing rate”);
Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner, and Robert E. Cook, New Information Reported under
HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement, 91 Fed Res Bull 344, 376, 379
(2005) (finding that blacks are denied housing loans at higher rates than whites, and given
worse loan terms, even controlling for an array of nonracial factors).
272 See Inclusive Communities, 135 S Ct at 2521–22; Havens, 455 US at 376, 381;
Gladstone, 441 US at 109–11; Trafficante, 409 US at 208.
273 Schwemm, Housing Discrimination § 10:5 at 10-38 to -39 (cited in note 6).
274 See id § 10:2 at 10-5 to -21 (noting the frequency of these cases). See also id § 13:2
at 13-4 to -8 (describing typical antidiscrimination claims).
275 See Robert G. Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and the Fair Housing Act, 54 Notre
Dame Law 199, 262 (1978) (characterizing “[t]he ‘big’ private housing case” as one aimed
at achieving “the congressional goal of an open, integrated society”). But see Shanna L.
Smith, The National Fair Housing Alliance at Work, in Robert D. Bullard, J. Eugene
Grigsby III, and Charles Lee, eds, Residential Apartheid: The American Legacy 237, 247–
48 (California 1994) (listing major antidiscrimination victories under the FHA).
271

STEPHANOPOULOS_ART_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Civil Rights in a Desegregating America

9/20/2016 2:00 PM

1377

rent to minorities, realtors will keep steering homebuyers to different neighborhoods, and so on. The resulting antidiscrimination
suits still may be small-bore, at least compared to the earlier battles over desegregation. But odds are they will be, if not the only
game in town, at least the most important one.276
On balance, I find appealing this account of how the FHA
eventually might function. Less would be asked of the statute, especially in terms of desegregation. But less would be needed,
given the ongoing declines in both racial separation and discrimination. Instead of fighting endlessly in the trenches, the law
might evolve into a sort of tactical reserve, intervening at times
to preserve existing gains and quell new uprisings. This is not a
heroic vision, but we are gradually moving toward an America
that may not require a heroic FHA.
III. VOTING RIGHTS ACT
The next civil rights statute I address is the Voting Rights
Act—in particular, its core operative provision, § 2, which bans
racial vote dilution.277 The VRA does not have as obvious a relationship as the FHA with racial groups’ residential patterns.
Why, after all, should the fate of a vote dilution claim hinge on the
segregation of a minority population? The answer cannot be found
in the law itself. It lies, instead, in the doctrine the courts have
devised to apply the VRA. The Supreme Court has held that there
can be liability only if a minority group is geographically compact—
that is, segregated. The Court also has required proof of racial polarization in voting.278 Polarization is conceptually distinct from
segregation, but as a methodological matter, it is easier to show
under segregated conditions. And for their part, the lower courts
have added racial separation to the list of factors that may be considered at the totality-of-circumstances stage of the analysis.279
As in the FHA case, integration interferes with all of these
elements. By definition, an integrated minority group is not geographically compact, and so cannot prevail in a VRA challenge.

276 I reiterate my earlier point that antidiscrimination suits under the FHA include
both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. See note 177.
277 See 52 USC § 10301. The VRA’s other key component, § 5, effectively was nullified
in Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down the VRA’s
coverage formula, which triggers § 5).
278 Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 50–51 (1986).
279 See text accompanying notes 344–47.
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Polarization also may exist in an integrated area, but the techniques typically used to estimate it are unreliable in this setting.
At the totality stage, too, integration weighs against a finding of
liability. But unlike in the FHA case, these implications are cause
for concern, not contentment. One of the VRA’s goals is minority
representation, and this aim is directly threatened by desegregation. Fortunately, the danger here is doctrinal rather than statutory, and so could be dispelled by judicial rather than legislative
action. To enable the VRA to play its proper role, the courts could
eliminate the compactness requirement, permit polarization to be
shown using new methods, and authorize remedies other than
single-member districts.
A.

Connection

Enacted in 1965 and substantially amended in 1982, § 2 of
the VRA now prohibits what is known as racial vote dilution:
state action, short of outright disenfranchisement, that makes it
more difficult for minority voters to elect their preferred candidates.280 Specifically, the provision forbids any “practice[ ] or procedure . . . which results in a[n] . . . abridgement of the right . . .
to vote on account of race or color.”281 “A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that
. . . members of a [minority group] have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate . . . to elect representatives of
their choice.”282 Section 2 also states that “[t]he extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office . . . is one
circumstance which may be considered.”283
A careful reader may notice that the statutory text does not
mention compactness, polarization, or racial separation. This observation is accurate. These concepts are part of § 2 law not because they are recognized by the provision itself, but rather because courts have inserted them into the doctrine. This insertion
280 Section 2 also prohibits outright disenfranchisement. See 52 USC § 10301(a) (banning “denial . . . of the right . . . to vote on account of race or color”); 52 USC § 10301(b)
(explaining that the provision is violated if minority “members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process”). See also Nicholas
O. Stephanopoulos, The South after Shelby County, 2013 S Ct Rev 55, 106–18 (discussing
the application of § 2 and § 5 of the VRA to vote-denial claims). Unlike vote dilution, vote
denial is not connected to racial groups’ residential patterns, and so I do not discuss it
further.
281 52 USC § 10301(a).
282 52 USC § 10301(b).
283 52 USC § 10301(b).

STEPHANOPOULOS_ART_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Civil Rights in a Desegregating America

9/20/2016 2:00 PM

1379

occurred most famously in the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision,
Thornburg v Gingles,284 its first construal of the amended statute.285 The Court held that there are three “necessary preconditions” for liability in vote dilution suits.286 First, “the minority
group must be . . . sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”287 Second,
the group must be “politically cohesive.”288 And third, “the white
majority [must] vote[ ] sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.”289 If these criteria are met, the final analytical step is a totality-of-circumstances
inquiry focused on the nine factors identified by the Senate report
that accompanied § 2’s revision in 1982.290
Of these elements, the one that is linked most directly to racial groups’ residential patterns is Gingles’s first prong, geographic compactness. To require a group to be geographically
compact before liability may be imposed, in essence, is to require
it to be residentially segregated. That the Court conceived of compactness and segregation as largely synonymous is clear from its
decision. At various points, it referred to the minority voters who
would be able to win vote dilution claims as “geographically insular”291 and “sufficiently concentrated.”292 It also contrasted these
voters with ones “spread evenly throughout a multimember district” and “substantially integrated throughout the jurisdiction,”
who would not be able to prevail.293 Commentators have pointed
out the convergence between compactness and segregation as
well. In Dana Carstarphen’s words, “the Court has made residential segregation a prerequisite to the protection of rights established by the Voting Rights Act.”294

284

478 US 30 (1986).
See Daniel P. Tokaji, Realizing the Right to Vote: The Story of Thornburg v.
Gingles, in Joshua A. Douglas and Eugene D. Mazo, eds, Election Law Stories 127, 158
(Foundation 2016) (“What is perhaps most surprising about the backstory to Gingles
is that its now-canonical test for vote dilution did not appear in any of the briefs, the
oral argument, nor even in the first draft of Justice Brennan’s opinion.”).
286 Gingles, 478 US at 50–51.
287 Id at 50.
288 Id at 51.
289 Id.
290 See Gingles, 478 US at 36–37.
291 Id at 49, 64, 80.
292 Id at 50 n 17, 64, 80.
293 Id at 50 n 17.
294 Dana R. Carstarphen, The Single Transferable Vote: Achieving the Goals of Section 2 without Sacrificing the Integration Ideal, 9 Yale L & Pol Rev 405, 406 (1991). See
285
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Why did the Court predicate § 2 liability on something as
seemingly unrelated as segregation? The explanation lies in the
only remedy the Court contemplated for violations of the provision: the creation of single-member districts. If a minority group
is segregated, a district easily can be drawn around it, and the
group then can elect its preferred candidate as long as Gingles’s
other criteria (sufficient size and racial polarization) are met.295
Conversely, if a group is residentially integrated, it becomes very
difficult for a district to capture enough of its members to enable
them to elect the candidate of their choice. To do so (where it is
possible at all), a district must assume a highly irregular shape,
connecting whatever local concentrations of the group happen to
occur. As the Court put it, if a group is not segregated, “as would
be the case in a substantially integrated [area],” then district
lines “cannot be responsible for minority voters’ inability to elect
[their preferred] candidates.”296
Importantly, the Court was correct that segregation can increase minority representation if single-member districts are

also, for example, Pamela S. Karlan, Our Separatism? Voting Rights as an American Nationalities Policy, 1995 U Chi Legal F 83, 87 (“The first [Gingles] element focuses on geographic segregation.”); Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 71 Tex L Rev 1589, 1623 (1993).
Many cases also have held that residentially segregated groups satisfy Gingles’s geographic compactness requirement. See, for example, Askew v City of Rome, 127 F3d 1355,
1371 (11th Cir 1997) (noting that “[n]early three quarters of Rome’s black population . . .
lives in majority black census blocks”); Large v Fremont County, Wyoming, 709 F Supp 2d
1176, 1191–92 (D Wyo 2010) (involving a Native American population of which the “vast
majority . . . resides on the Reservation” and “is concentrated in [three] communities”);
King v State Board of Elections, 979 F Supp 582, 608 (ND Ill 1996) (observing “clustering
of Hispanics into two densely populated enclaves” in Chicago). I do not discuss these cases
in the main text because the point about compactness and segregation being overlapping
concepts seems so clear.
295 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U Chi L Rev
769, 844 (2013) (noting that single-member districts “can benefit only minority groups that
are large and geographically dense”).
296 Gingles, 478 US at 50. See also id at 50 n 17 (“The single-member district is generally the appropriate standard against which to measure minority group potential to
elect.”). The compactness requirement also might be justified on the ground that a segregated minority group is more likely to be the victim of discrimination than an integrated
one—and thus in greater need of judicial protection. But this is not the Court’s own explanation for the requirement; the relationship between segregation and discrimination is far
from ironclad; and polarization (the focus of Gingles’s next two steps) seems a better proxy
for discrimination than segregation.
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used.297 Two recent studies examine how a state’s index of dissimilarity (calculated for minorities and nonminorities, and for counties within the state) is related to its number of congressional
majority-minority districts.298 Both studies find that, even controlling for minority population size, partisan control, and redistricting criteria, more segregated states tend to have more majorityminority districts.299 In fact, as the dissimilarity index varies from
its lowest to its highest level, states form over two times more districts in which minorities can elect the candidate of their choice.300
These results confirm that a compactness requirement is reasonable as long as § 2 remedies are restricted to single-member districts.
Turning next to Gingles’s second and third prongs,301 they are
tied methodologically rather than substantively to segregation.
Minority political cohesion (the second prong) and white bloc voting (the third one) boil down to a single concept: racial polarization in voting.302 If most minorities support one candidate, and
most whites back her opponent, then voting is racially polarized
(and vice versa). Polarization, in turn, has no inherent connection
to segregation.303 Racial groups can prefer different candidates
while living near one another, or the same candidate while living

297 Segregation, though, does not necessarily increase minority representation. Clusters of minority voters also can be split by district lines, rendering the voters unable to
elect their preferred candidates.
298 See Carl E. Klarner, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation: A Reanalysis, 7 State Polit & Pol Q 298, 299 (2007); Jason Barabas and Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation, 4 State Polit & Pol Q 415, 423 (2004). By
law, all congressional districts are represented by single members. See 2 USC § 2c.
299 See Klarner, 7 State Polit & Pol Q at 299 (cited in note 298); Barabas and Jerit, 4
State Polit & Pol Q at 423 (cited in note 298). Klarner also found that more segregated
states tend to have higher shares of majority-minority districts. See Klarner, 7 State Polit
& Pol Q at 299 (cited in note 298).
300 This is because the dissimilarity index varies from 0.33 to 0.93 and its regression
coefficient is 4.41. See Klarner, 7 State Polit & Pol Q at 299 (cited in note 298); Barabas
and Jerit, 4 State Polit & Pol Q at 421, 423 (cited in note 298).
301 See Gingles, 478 US at 50–51.
302 See Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley, and Richard G. Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality 82 (Cambridge 1992) (observing that polarization
is “the foundation for two of the three prongs of the Gingles test”).
303 Unlike geographic compactness, the polarization requirement does not stem from
an assumption that single-member districts are the only available remedy. Polarization is
necessary for there to be racial vote dilution in the first place. If a minority group is not
politically cohesive, then there is no minority-preferred candidate. Similarly, if there is no
white bloc voting, then there is no enduring obstacle to the election of the minority’s candidate of choice. See Gingles, 478 US at 51.
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apart.304 But both of the techniques typically used to measure polarization rely on segregated residential patterns. Segregation is
what makes these techniques feasible.
The simpler method to calculate polarization is homogeneous
precinct analysis.305 First, election precincts that are highly (usually over 90 percent) racially homogeneous are identified.306 Second, the results of elections involving a minority candidate of
choice are compiled for these precincts. And third, these results
are used to determine the extent of minority political cohesion
and white bloc voting.307 As should be obvious, all of these steps
hinge on the presence of racially homogeneous precincts—that is,
segregation.308 Only if there exist precincts at least 90 percent of
whose voters belong to the same race can the analysis begin. As
Professor Bernard Grofman, Dr. Lisa Handley, and Professor
Richard G. Niemi comment, “if there are precincts that are overwhelmingly (say, 90 or 95 percent) composed of members of the
same race, one can be extremely confident of the voting behavior
of members of that group.”309
The more advanced approach to estimating polarization is
ecological regression (of which there exist still more sophisticated
variants, such as Professor Gary King’s ecological inference).310
All precincts, not only racially homogeneous ones, are used by this

304 But see Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev 173, 203 (1989) (speculating that polarization might be lower in integrated areas). In future work, I plan to
assess empirically the polarization-segregation relationship.
305 See Gingles, 478 US at 52–53 & n 20 (referring to the district court’s finding that
“extreme case analysis” is “standard in the literature for the analysis of racially polarized
voting”).
306 See Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 464 (cited in note 30) (referring to a 90 percent cutoff).
307 For example, if a precinct is 95 percent black and 5 percent white, and a minority
candidate of choice wins the precinct by a margin of 85 percent to 15 percent, then the
candidate must have won between 84 percent and 89 percent of the black vote. This is a
very narrow (and thus very useful) range of possible minority cohesion scores.
308 Strictly speaking, what is necessary here is a high score on the isolation index,
indicating that most minority members live in minority-heavy neighborhoods.
309 Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting
Equality at 85 (cited in note 302). See also Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 464 (cited in note 30)
(“[I]f one racial group dominates . . . then the observed vote totals in that precinct can be
safely attributed to this racial group alone.”).
310 See Gingles, 478 US at 52–53 & n 20 (referring to the district court’s finding that
“bivariate ecological regression analysis” is “standard in the literature for the analysis of
racially polarized voting”). See also Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality at 82–105 (cited in note 302). See also generally
Gary King, A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior from Aggregate Data (Princeton 1997).
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technique. The share of the vote received by the minority-preferred
candidate in each precinct then is regressed on each precinct’s minority population share. The fit of this regression indicates how
well electoral preferences are explained by race, while the 0 percent and 100 percent intercepts denote the levels of minority political cohesion and white bloc voting.
Again, this procedure works best when most voters in most
precincts belong to the same race. Under these conditions, impossible conclusions (for instance, that 110 percent of black voters
support the black candidate of choice) are rare.311 The impact of
the ecological fallacy, which points out that individuals’ preferences cannot be ascertained using group-level data, is reduced
too.312 The procedure also is most tenable when voters belong to
either of precisely two races. Then the proportions that are inputted into the model do not hide the presence of other racial
groups, and valuable information about voting and demography
is not sacrificed.313 Ecological regression thus depends on not only
a segregated society, but also a biracial one.314
Lastly, recall that Gingles’s final step is a totality-of-circumstances
inquiry in which the nine Senate factors take center stage.315 Racial
separation is not one of these factors, but numerous lower courts
nevertheless have added it to the list of items that should be considered.316 For example, one court observed that South Carolina’s
“Charleston County remains to a large extent separated along racial lines.”317 The area’s segregation weighed in favor of § 2 liability
because it “hinder[ed] the ability of African–American candidates
to solicit the votes of white voters.”318 Similarly, another court noted
311 See Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 464 (cited in note 30) (“Without the bounds to constrain
the numbers, impossible results can (and often do) occur.”).
312 See Christopher S. Elmendorf and Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act after Shelby County, 115 Colum L Rev 2143, 2159 (2015) (commenting that ecological regression “works reasonably well when . . . precincts are racially
homogenous”).
313 See Greiner, 47 Jurimetrics at 157 (cited in note 28) (“[E]cological regression is
especially problematic when applied to precinct tables of size larger than two by two.”);
Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 465–67 (cited in note 30).
314 For an exhaustive list of cases relying on both homogeneous precinct analysis and
ecological regression, generally under segregated conditions, see Greiner, 47 Jurimetrics
at 155–57 (cited in note 28).
315 See Gingles, 478 US at 36–37.
316 See Ellen Katz, et al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings
under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act since 1982, 39 U Mich J L Ref 643, 706 (2006)
(noting this trend).
317 United States v Charleston County, 316 F Supp 2d 268, 292 (D SC 2003).
318 Id.
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the high black-white dissimilarity index of Euclid, Ohio.319 Here
too, “racial separation in Euclid’s housing . . . serve[d] to hamper
the ability of African–American candidates to fully engage the
predominately white electorate.”320
To be sure, not all of § 2 revolves around segregation. Gingles’s
first prong also implicates the size of the minority population and
the shape of the district that could be drawn around it.321 As a substantive matter, the second and third prongs involve racial
groups’ electoral preferences, not their residential patterns.322
And the nine Senate factors do not even refer to racial separation
(though they do emphasize one of its key causes, discrimination).323 Still, it seems undeniable that segregation plays a substantial (if not exclusive) role at each § 2 stage. Next, I show how
these functions are compromised by rising integration. Both in
theory and in practice, integrated minority groups face serious
obstacles in winning vote dilution challenges.
B.

Complication

The problems posed by integration are clearest with respect
to Gingles’s first prong. Minority voters who are residentially integrated are the very opposite of a geographically compact group.
In the Court’s terminology, they are diffuse rather than “insular,”
dilute rather than “concentrated.”324 Accordingly, they cannot prevail under § 2, because they fail one of the Court’s “necessary preconditions” for liability.325 As Professor Richard Briffault puts it,
“Where minorities are residentially scattered . . . it [is] difficult to
create [the] majority-minority districts” assumed by Gingles to be
the only available remedy for vote dilution.326
The Court confronted “largely integrated communities” of
Houston-area blacks and Hispanics in an important 1996 case.327
319

See United States v City of Euclid, 580 F Supp 2d 584, 606 (ND Ohio 2008).
Id at 613.
321 See Gingles, 478 US at 50.
322 See id at 51.
323 See id at 36–37 (noting that these factors include “any history of official discrimination” and “the extent to which members of the minority group . . . bear the effects of
discrimination”).
324 Id at 49, 50 n 17.
325 Gingles, 478 US at 50.
326 Richard Briffault, Book Review, Lani Guinier and the Dilemmas of American Democracy, 95 Colum L Rev 418, 430 (1995). See also Carstarphen, 9 Yale L & Pol Rev at
410 (cited in note 294) (“Gingles makes it difficult for residentially dispersed minorities to
obtain a remedy for vote dilution.”); Karlan, 1995 U Chi Legal F at 89 (cited in note 294).
327 Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 1033 (1996) (Stevens dissenting).
320
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The plaintiffs argued that § 2 required “two of the three least
regular districts in the country” to be constructed, one with a
black majority and the other with a Hispanic majority.328 A plurality
rejected this claim, declaring, “If, because of the dispersion of the
minority population, a reasonably compact majority-minority
district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a majority-minority
district.”329 In the lower courts, a notable case of an integrated
group failing to satisfy Gingles’s first prong arose in Louisiana
in the 1980s. Blacks in Jefferson Parish were “dispersed widely”
with small black clusters scattered throughout the region.330
The only district that could enclose a black majority “contain[ed] no less than 35 sides” and crossed the “major natural
boundary” of the Mississippi River.331 The court therefore held
that the black population was not “sufficiently compact” and
that the plaintiffs’ proposed district was not “an acceptable remedy to the vote dilution.”332
Moreover, not only are integrated minority voters unable to
comply with Gingles’s first prong, but if a district nevertheless is
drawn around them, it is likely to be unconstitutional. Under the
Court’s racial gerrymandering doctrine, a district is unlawful if
“race was the predominant factor motivating” the district’s formation.333 Race often has been found to be the predominant motive when scattered minority voters were corralled within the

328

Id at 973 (O’Connor) (plurality).
Id at 979 (O’Connor) (plurality).
330 East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development v Parish of Jefferson, 691
F Supp 991, 1006–07 (ED La 1988).
331 Id at 1007.
332 Id. For additional examples of integrated minority groups failing to comply with
Gingles’s geographic compactness requirement, see Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899, 916 (1996)
(“Shaw II”) (“No one looking at District 12 could reasonably suggest that the district contains a ‘geographically compact’ population of any race.”); Potter v Washington County,
Florida, 653 F Supp 121, 129 (ND Fla 1986) (finding no geographic compactness when the
black population was “dispersed throughout Washington County”).
It also is worth noting that residential integration is not the only geographic scenario
that can prevent Gingles’s first prong from being satisfied. Several cases have held that
when minorities live in numerous separate communities—even segregated ones—they do
not form a compact population required by § 2 to be placed into the same district. See, for
example, Sensley v Albritton, 385 F3d 591, 597 (5th Cir 2004) (involving a proposed district
with “two areas of highly-concentrated African–American population . . . linked together
by a narrow corridor”); Johnson v Mortham, 926 F Supp 1460, 1471–72 (ND Fla 1996) (“In
order to achieve its goal of creating a minority-majority district in northeast Florida, the
court was forced to link these widely dispersed population concentrations together.”);
Terrazas v Clements, 581 F Supp 1329, 1358 (ND Tex 1984) (“[T]he district lines merely
fail to string together dispersed pockets of [H]ispanic population.”).
333 Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 916 (1995).
329
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same odd-looking district. For instance, the Court invalidated the
Houston-area districts noted above, in part because they “connect[ed] dispersed minority population[s]” and “capture[d] pockets of Hispanic residents.”334 Similarly, in another landmark 1996
case,335 the Court struck down an elongated North Carolina district that enclosed the “relatively dispersed” black population in
the state’s center.336 In the Court’s view, a district including “individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise
widely separated by geographical . . . boundaries . . . bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid.”337
Next, with respect to Gingles’s second and third prongs, integration presents technical rather than substantive hurdles. If
there are few racially homogeneous precincts in an area, analyses
requiring such precincts can be conducted only with difficulty. Reliable inferences about racial groups’ electoral preferences cannot
be drawn from precincts with diverse populations.338 Likewise,
ecological regression is less accurate when minorities and whites
live in more integrated patterns. The confidence bounds of the
method’s estimates increase, impossible results are more common, and the impact of contestable assumptions grows.339 As Professor James Greiner explains, “current circumstances, particularly an increasingly melting-pot United States polity, now

334

Vera, 517 US at 966, 975 (O’Connor) (plurality).
See generally Shaw II, 517 US 899.
336 Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630, 634 (1993) (“Shaw I”); Shaw II, 517 US at 918 (invalidating this district).
337 Shaw I, 509 US at 647. The converse of this proposition is true as well: Districts
enclosing segregated minority populations are unlikely to be unconstitutional, because
they usually can be justified on nonracial grounds such as compactness and respect for
communities of interest. See, for example, Lawyer v Department of Justice, 521 US 567,
581 (1997) (upholding a Tampa Bay district that “comprise[d] a predominantly urban, lowincome population”); Shaw I, 509 US at 646 (“[W]hen members of a racial group live together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates . . . the group in one
district . . . may reflect wholly legitimate purposes.”).
338 See Grofman, Handley, and Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality at 88–89 (cited in note 302) (“[I]t may not always be possible to use [homogeneous precinct analysis] because of the absence of sufficiently homogeneous precincts.”);
Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 463–64 (cited in note 30).
339 See Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 464–68 (cited in note 30). See also Grofman, Handley, and
Niemi, Minority Representation and the Quest for Voting Equality at 104 (cited in note 302)
(noting that “situations . . . in which federal courts have failed to find the results of [polarization] methods to be reliable” include those where “minority populations were heavily
intermingled”); Elmendorf and Spencer, 115 Colum L Rev at 2159 (cited in note 312) (“[A]s
neighborhoods become less homogeneous, the amount of information about racial voting
patterns in the precinct-level data becomes very sparse.”).
335
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challenge these techniques [for measuring polarization] in new
ways.”340
These concerns are not merely academic. In a 1980s case from
California, there was a “dispersion of [H]ispanics and blacks
throughout the City of Pomona.”341 As a result, the court rejected
the plaintiffs’ estimates of minority political cohesion and white
bloc voting. “Their homogenous precincts analysis is inappropriate because, due to the dispersion of minorities . . . there are no
homogenous precincts that are 90 to 100% of one race.”342 Similarly,
in a recent case from Alabama, Hispanics and Native Americans
were substantially integrated throughout the state. Here too, the
court declined to credit the plaintiffs’ allegations about polarization
because there was “an insufficient concentration of Native Americans or Hispanics . . . for ecological regression analysis.”343
Lastly, just as the presence of racial separation may weigh in
favor of liability at the totality-of-circumstances stage, its absence
may point in the opposite direction. In a striking 2000s case from
Colorado, the court found that all of the Gingles factors likely
were satisfied.344 The court nevertheless upheld the at-large election of Alamosa County’s commissioners, in part because of the
“extensive integration and association among Hispanic and Anglo
residents.”345 The court observed that “Hispanic residents now
live, work, and own businesses both north and south of the [old]
demarcation line,” and that “Hispanic residents . . . are not as geographically and socially isolated.”346 This intermingling precluded
§ 2 liability, according to the court, because it showed that racial
discrimination was no longer prevalent in the county.347

340

Greiner, 86 Ind L J at 462 (cited in note 30).
Romero v City of Pomona, 665 F Supp 853, 859 (CD Cal 1987).
342 Id at 866. For another example of a court rejecting homogeneous precinct analysis, see Rollins v Fort Bend Independent School District, 89 F3d 1205, 1215 n 17 (5th Cir
1996) (“[P]laintiffs’ extreme case analyses . . . were unreliable because they did not involve precincts containing populations with a particular race comprising ninety percent
of the precinct.”).
343 Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v Alabama, 989 F Supp 2d 1227, 1270 (MD Ala
2013), vacd 135 S Ct 1257 (2015). For another example of a court rejecting ecological regression, see Nixon v Kent County, Michigan, 790 F Supp 738, 747 (WD Mich 1992) (“[A]
lack of substantial Hispanic concentration in Kent County precludes . . . bivariate ecological regression.”).
344 See United States v Alamosa County, Colorado, 306 F Supp 2d 1016, 1028–33 (D
Colo 2004).
345 Id at 1020.
346 Id at 1020, 1036.
347 See id at 1038.
341
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As with the FHA, these examples of § 2 claims being undercut by integration are rarer than the reverse scenario—namely,
§ 2 claims being bolstered by segregation.348 As before, the relative
dearth of the former cases probably is attributable to the recency
of America’s desegregative trend, as well as strategic decisions by
plaintiffs to file suit in areas that remain segregated.349 And
again, the key points for present purposes are that integration
does complicate each § 2 element, and that these problems are
likely to worsen as the country desegregates further. Below, I discuss the operation of § 2 under more integrated conditions. I explain how the doctrine construing the provision could be amended
to allow it to continue promoting minority representation.
C.

Conciliation

I was mostly sanguine earlier about the FHA’s future role for
one simple reason: The statute aims to bring about “integrated
and balanced living patterns.”350 Since housing segregation has
been falling and probably will keep falling, the law is progressing
toward the achievement of one of its core objectives. Unfortunately, such optimism is not in order for § 2. Residential integration is not one of § 2’s goals. But minority representation is one of
them, and for all of the reasons discussed above, it is imperiled by
desegregation. Lawsuits making possible the election of minoritypreferred candidates become ever harder to win as minority voters grow ever more dispersed.
That § 2 seeks (among other things) to improve minority representation is clear from the statutory text itself. The provision
emphasizes minority voters’ “opportunity . . . to elect representatives of their choice.”351 It also provides that the “extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office . . . is one
circumstance which may be considered.”352 The legislative history
confirms this purpose. One of the Senate factors that courts evaluate at Gingles’s totality-of-circumstances stage is the “extent to
which members of the minority group have been elected to public
348

See note 259 and accompanying text.
See note 260 and accompanying text.
350 Trafficante v Metropolitan Life Insurance Co, 409 US 205, 211 (1972). See also
Part II.C.
351 52 USC § 10301(b).
352 52 USC § 10301(b). Representatives of minorities’ choice are not necessarily identical to representatives who are minority members themselves. The former term refers to
politicians preferred by minority voters, while the latter denotes politicians of a particular
race, regardless of the support they enjoy from minority voters.
349

STEPHANOPOULOS_ART_FLIP (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

Civil Rights in a Desegregating America

9/20/2016 2:00 PM

1389

office.”353 The 1982 Senate report notes as well that “the presence
of minority elected officials is a recognized indicator of access to
the process.”354
It is true that minority representation is not § 2’s only goal.
The provision also tries to stop cruder practices that hinder minority voters’ access to the polls or disenfranchise them outright.355 It is true as well that minority representation is a controversial objective. Opponents of the 1982 amendments warned
that the revisions would require proportionality in the election of
minority officials.356 Justice Clarence Thomas famously has decried the whole concept of vote dilution as a “hopeless project” and
a “disastrous misadventure.”357 And Justice Anthony Kennedy
may believe that § 2 only protects (and can ever compel) “naturally arising” majority-minority districts in minority-heavy areas.358 But these are largely dissenting voices. The prevailing
view, at least in most court decisions and among most litigants,
is that minority representation is indeed part of § 2’s mission. As
Professor Lani Guinier remarks, “The belief that black representation is everything has defined litigation strategy under the Voting Rights Act.”359

353 Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No 97-417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 29 (1982). See
also Gingles, 478 US at 48 n 15 (1986) (describing this factor as one of “the most important
. . . bearing on § 2 challenges to multimember districts”).
354 S Rep No 97-417 at 16 (cited in note 353). And in the case law, the Supreme Court
has made a minority group’s deviation from proportional representation one of the linchpins of § 2 doctrine. See Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1025 (1994) (O’Connor concurring) (“The opinion’s central teaching is that proportionality . . . is always relevant evidence in determining vote dilution.”).
355 See note 280. It is also true that an argument can be made that § 2 seeks to provide
representation only to coherent geographic communities of minority voters. Indeed, I previously have advanced such a claim myself. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting
and the Territorial Community, 160 U Pa L Rev 1379, 1416–19 (2012). The trouble with
this claim is that it is based on Gingles and its progeny, not the statutory text or legislative
history. There is virtually no indication in the text or history that Congress intended for
§ 2 to be limited to compact minority clusters. See Karlan, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 199
(cited in note 304) (“Geographic concerns played only a minor role in the legislative history
of amended Section 2.”).
356 See, for example, S Rep No 97-417 at 96 (cited in note 353) (statement of Sen
Hatch) (claiming that the amendments create a “clear and inevitable mandate for proportional representation”).
357 Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 892–93 (1994) (Thomas concurring in the judgment).
358 Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68
Ohio St L J 1139, 1146–47 (2007).
359 Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of
Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich L Rev 1077, 1078 (1991).
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How, then, can § 2 continue to secure minority representation
in an integrating America? In fact, there are several ways, of varying potency and plausibility. First, and most intuitively, Gingles’s
geographic compactness requirement could be eliminated. If minority groups did not have to be compact—that is, segregated—to
establish liability, then dispersed groups would be able to prevail
in vote dilution suits. Integration would not thwart them at the
first step of the Gingles framework. The same point holds for remedies. If courts could order the creation of odd-looking districts
containing scattered minority voters, then appropriate relief
would be available for integrated plaintiffs. They would be able
both to show a violation of § 2 and to cure it.360
Second, and relatedly, the cause of action for racial gerrymandering could be discarded. This theory already has been criticized because it makes the message allegedly conveyed by a district a constitutional offense, even in the absence of any tangible
injury.361 The theory has the additional drawback of rendering
suspect the irregular districts that are needed to capture dispersed minority voters. These districts can be explained only on
racial grounds, but any racial explanation triggers strict scrutiny,
which the districts typically cannot survive. Accordingly, if the
theory were cast aside, there would no longer be an equal protection threat to constituencies that enable integrated minorities to
elect their preferred candidates. These districts would be valid
under § 2 and free from their current constitutional shadow.362

360 For other scholars criticizing Gingles’s first prong, see Carstarphen, 9 Yale L &
Pol Rev at 418 (cited in note 294) (“[T]he courts should begin by eliminating the compactness requirement.”); Karlan, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 202–03 (cited in note 304). Precisely
because of the incongruity of linking minority representation to residential segregation,
the California Voting Rights Act, which otherwise mirrors its federal analogue, does not
compel a showing of compactness. See Sanchez v City of Modesto, 145 Cal App 4th 660,
667 (2006).
361 For an early critique of racial gerrymandering doctrine, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff
and Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines after Shaw v.
Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 588, 650 (1993) (noting the doctrine’s “tremendous failings of intellectual coherence and practical application”). For the definitive work on the expressive harm
contemplated by the doctrine, see generally Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
after Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 483 (1993).
362 See Aleinikoff and Issacharoff, 92 Mich L Rev at 618 (cited in note 361) (criticizing
racial gerrymandering doctrine because it “condemns ‘race-conscious’ attempts to craft
minority districts from scattered minority communities, yet complacently relies upon massive residential discrimination to justify compact majority-minority districts”).
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Third, plaintiffs could start employing (and courts could start
endorsing) additional techniques for measuring polarization. Surveys, in particular, hold enormous promise. Because they ask individuals about their electoral preferences, they avoid the ecological fallacy entirely. Their results are just as accurate whether
precincts are racially homogeneous or heterogeneous, or whether
there are two racial groups or more.363 The cost of surveys also is
decreasing as online polling becomes more prevalent.364 Furthermore, statistical methods have emerged recently that allow public
opinion in small geographic units to be calculated using modestly
sized samples.365 And as Greiner and Professor Kevin Quinn
demonstrate, surveys can be combined with conventional techniques to produce more reliable polarization estimates than either approach alone. “[T]he hybrid is always preferable to the ecological model,” and also “dominates the survey sample
estimator.”366
Lastly, and most impactfully, litigants and courts could be
more receptive to remedies other than single-member districts.
No matter how cleverly they are drawn, it is difficult for such districts to enclose scattered minority voters—and impossible for
them to provide representation to small minority groups. In contrast, multimember districts paired with cumulative, limited, or
preferential voting face neither of these obstacles.367 They enable
integrated minorities as well as minorities too small to constitute

363 Surveys, of course, have methodological issues of their own, such as high nonresponse rates, potentially nonrepresentative samples, questionable validity, and so on. See,
for example, Cottier v City of Martin, 604 F3d 553, 559 (8th Cir 2010) (en banc) (citing
these concerns as a reason not to credit an exit poll in a § 2 case).
364 For example, Survey Sampling International’s price for a short nationwide online
survey with two thousand respondents is only about $7,000, according to a quote obtained
from the company (on file with the editors).
365 See generally, for example, Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data Analysis Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models (Cambridge 2007) (introducing multilevel regression and poststratification techniques).
366 D. James Greiner and Kevin M. Quinn, Exit Polling and Racial Bloc Voting:
Combining Individual-Level and R × C Ecological Data, 4 Annals of Applied Stat 1774,
1777 (2010).
367 Under cumulative voting, each voter has as many votes as there are seats to be
filled, and can allocate these votes as she sees fit (including by casting multiple votes for
a single candidate). Under limited voting, each voter has fewer votes than there are seats
to be filled, and usually can cast up to one vote per candidate. And under preferential
voting, each voter ranks the candidates in her order of preference, and these rankings then
are used to fill the seats. See Stephanopoulos, 80 U Chi L Rev at 835 (cited in note 295)
(describing these systems).
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a local majority to elect the candidates of their choice.368 As Professor Shaun Bowler and his coauthors find in a notable study,
counties using cumulative or limited voting elect higher shares of
black commissioners than counties using single-member districts.369 The alternative voting systems are unaffected by the geographic and numerical constraints that apply to traditional districts.
All of these options are appealing because they could be implemented without legislative action. A Congress that cannot
agree on a new coverage formula for the VRA’s other core provision, § 5, is highly unlikely to amend § 2 in any significant way.370
However, the first two proposals are only slightly more plausible
than congressional intervention. The current Court is no fan of
§ 2, having frequently limited its reach and raised doubts about
its constitutionality.371 The odds thus are low that the Court, at
least as presently composed, would scrap Gingles’s compactness
requirement or reverse its racial gerrymandering rulings.
This leaves the third and fourth options, both of which could
be undertaken without any Court involvement. No Court precedent precludes either the use of surveys to measure polarization
or the judicial imposition of alternative remedies. These steps,
then, should be the top priorities for plaintiffs and lower courts
who would like § 2 to keep promoting minority representation
even as residential integration rises. They are the most realistic
ways to prevent a key statutory goal from being frustrated by a
368 See id at 846–55 (arguing at length for these systems). For other similar arguments, see Briffault, Book Review, 95 Colum L Rev at 433–34 (cited in note 326); Guinier,
71 Tex L Rev at 1637 (cited in note 294); Karlan, 24 Harv CR–CL L Rev at 221–36 (cited
in note 304).
369 See Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and David Brockington, Electoral Reform and
Minority Representation: Local Experiments with Alternative Elections 100–01 (Ohio
State 2003).
370 Although the Court in Shelby County invited Congress to act, Congress has not
done so. See Shelby County, 133 S Ct at 2631 (noting that “Congress may draft another
formula based on current conditions”).
371 See, for example, Bartlett v Strickland, 556 US 1, 26 (2009) (Kennedy) (plurality)
(holding that the first Gingles prong is satisfied only if it is possible to draw an additional
majority-minority district); id at 21–23 (Kennedy) (plurality) (seeking to avoid “serious
constitutional concerns [about § 2] under the Equal Protection Clause”). Another argument against the first two proposals is that, while they might lead to greater descriptive
representation for minorities, this benefit could come at the cost of reduced substantive representation. See, for example, Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran,
Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?,
90 Am Polit Sci Rev 794, 804–09 (1996) (finding empirically that the answer to the title’s
question is no). But see Adam B. Cox and Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and
Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U Chi L Rev 553, 586–90 (2011) (explaining that there is no
necessary tension between descriptive and substantive representation for minorities).
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trend that ought to be irrelevant—but in fact is all too salient at
every stage in the analysis.
IV. SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW
The final area I cover is constitutional rather than statutory:
school desegregation law, which bans the intentional segregation
of public schools and requires aggressive remedies to be maintained until all vestiges of the original violation have been eliminated. In this domain, of course, it is school segregation statistics
that are crucial, not residential ones. I therefore begin this Part
by summarizing the changes in, and causes of, school segregation.
Public schools desegregated rapidly between the late 1960s and
the late 1980s, and have sustained about the same level of racial
separation ever since. The brisk drop was largely the result of judicial intervention, while the recent stasis comes from court orders being lifted while residential desegregation exerts a steady
downward influence.
Next, I describe the role that residential segregation historically played in school desegregation litigation. It created conditions in which school district policies could have a segregative effect, from which an inference of segregative intent then could be
drawn. It also made it harder for integrative measures to succeed,
and so hindered districts’ efforts to attain unitary status. I then
argue that residential integration has the opposite doctrinal implications. To the extent it promotes school integration, it weighs
against a finding of segregative intent. Also to this extent, it assists school districts seeking unitary status.
Lastly, I comment on the state of school desegregation law as
America continues to integrate residentially. On the positive side,
there is reason to think that public schools will resume integrating in the near future, even if courts remain mostly somnolent,
thanks to the ongoing residential trend. Less sunnily, the impact
of this trend on school segregation is likely to be gradual, contingent on other factors, and less potent than judicial intervention.
The impact, such as it is, also has no bearing on other racial imbalances in schools, involving faculty assignment, physical facilities, and the like. The need for courts to stay involved in this
area—indeed, to become more involved—thus is undiminished.
A.

Trends and Causes

School segregation is measured in the same way as residential segregation, only using different units. Public schools (rather
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than census tracts) are the subunits in nearly all studies. School
districts and metropolitan areas are the most common broader
regions.372 Enrollment data about these entities enable the calculation of both evenness metrics like the index of dissimilarity and
exposure metrics like the index of isolation. Here, the dissimilarity index represents the fraction of students who would have to
switch schools in order for every school in the district or metropolitan area to have the same racial makeup.373 Similarly, the isolation index indicates, for the typical student of a certain race, the
share of students in her school who belong to the same racial
group.374 As in the residential context, the dissimilarity index is
preferred by most scholars because it is unaffected by group size
and better captures the colloquial meaning of segregation.375
In a helpful study, Professors Logan, Deirdre Oakley, and
Jacob Stowell compute the black-white dissimilarity index for
school districts and metropolitan areas in 1970 (just as courtordered desegregation began in earnest), 1990, and 2000.376 As
shown in a chart reproduced in Figure 4, the score for the average
district fell from close to 80 percent in 1970 to just under 50 percent in 1990 and 2000.377 The score for the average metropolitan
area declined from about 80 percent in 1970 to roughly 65 percent
in 1990 and 2000.378 (Metropolitan area segregation is higher than
school district segregation because each area’s districts vary—often starkly—in their racial complexions.) More recently, Kori
Stroub and Professor Meredith Richards estimate the entropy index (a more sophisticated variant of the dissimilarity index) at

372 See Charles T. Clotfelter, After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School Desegregation 57 (Princeton 2004) (giving reasons for considering both school districts and metropolitan areas); John R. Logan, Deirdre Oakley, and Jacob Stowell, School Segregation in
Metropolitan Regions, 1970–2000: The Impacts of Policy Choices on Public Education, 113
Am J Sociology 1611, 1622 (2008) (same).
373 See Reardon and Owens, 40 Ann Rev Sociology at 201 (cited in note 34).
374 See id.
375 See Jeremy E. Fiel, Decomposing School Resegregation: Social Closure, Racial Imbalance, and Racial Isolation, 78 Am Sociological Rev 828, 829 (2013) (noting that because
“measures of exposure are confounded with the population’s racial composition . . . [m]any
sociologists [ ] prefer measures of racial imbalance—also known as unevenness—to study
school segregation”). See also, for example, John Logan, Resegregation in American Public
Schools? Not in the 1990s *3 (Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional
Research, Apr 26, 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/3MTB-XPE2.
376 See Logan, Oakley, and Stowell, 113 Am J Sociology at 1622 (cited in note 372).
377 See id at 1628.
378 See id at 1627.
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the metropolitan area level from 1993 to 2009.379 As also shown in
Figure 4, black-white school segregation decreased slightly over
this period.380 The overall picture thus is one of sharp desegregation from the late 1960s to the late 1980s, followed by stability
ever since.381
It is worth noting that certain scholars, in particular Professors Erica Frankenberg and Gary Orfield, dispute this account.
They claim that American schools actually are resegregating,
based on data indicating that the typical black student now has a
smaller share of white classmates, and is more likely to attend a
heavily minority school, than in the 1980s.382 These shifts, however, are attributable entirely to demographic changes (in particular, Hispanic and Asian immigration and the lower white birth
rate), not to the distribution of students across schools.383 As
whites become an ever smaller fraction of the student population,

379 See Kori J. Stroub and Meredith P. Richards, From Resegregation to Reintegration:
Trends in the Racial/Ethnic Segregation of Metropolitan Public Schools, 1993–2009, 50
Am Educ Rsrch J 497, 509–11 (2013).
380 See id at 509–12.
381 For more studies confirming this account, see Brian P. An and Adam Gamoran,
Trends in School Racial Composition in the Era of Unitary Status, in Claire E. Smrekar
and Ellen B. Goldring, eds, From the Courtroom to the Classroom: The Shifting Landscape
of School Desegregation 19, 26 (Harvard 2009) (showing the stability of various entropy
indices from 1990 to 2000); Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd, 8 Am L & Econ Rev at 358 (cited
in note 35) (showing the stability of several segregation metrics over the period from 1993
to 2003); Fiel, 78 Am Sociological Rev at 829 (cited in note 375) (showing a slight decrease
in the white-nonwhite entropy index over the period from 1993 to 2010); Frankenberg, 45
Educ & Urban Society at 555 (cited in note 36) (showing a small decline in the black-white
dissimilarity index from 2000 to 2010); Christine H. Rossell and David J. Armor, The Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans, 1968-1991, 24 Am Polit Q 267, 274 (1996) (showing a decline in the black-white dissimilarity index from 1968 to 1991); Finis Welch and
Audrey Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation *39–43 (United States Commission
on Civil Rights, June 1987), archived at http://perma.cc/784T-WVQX (showing changes in
the dissimilarity index from 1967 to 1985 for 125 different districts).
382 See Erica Frankenberg, Chungmei Lee, and Gary Orfield, A Multiracial Society
with Segregated Schools: Are We Losing the Dream? *30–31 (Civil Rights Project, Jan
2003), archived at http://perma.cc/5AUD-V5GP; Gary Orfield and Erica Frankenberg,
Brown at 60: Great Progress, a Long Retreat, and an Uncertain Future *18 (Civil Rights
Project, May 15, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8BCA-FG79.
383 See An and Gamoran, Trends in School Racial Composition in the Era of Unitary
Status at 20 (cited in note 381); Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd, 8 Am L & Econ Rev at 381
(cited in note 35) (“[T]he rise in this measure is the result of demographic change rather
than any growing racial imbalance among schools.”); Fiel, 78 Am Sociological Rev at 839
(cited in note 375) (showing that black-white and Hispanic-white exposure would have
increased substantially from 1993 to 2010 had it not been for the declining white share of
the student population); Logan, Oakley, and Stowell, 113 Am J Sociology at 1637 (cited in
note 372); Reardon and Owens, 40 Ann Rev Sociology at 203–04 (cited in note 34); Stroub
and Richards, 50 Am Educ Rsrch J at 499 (cited in note 379).
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it is inevitable that minorities will be exposed to fewer of them.384
(It also is inevitable that whites will be exposed to more minorities, which implies more rather than less integration.385) I therefore join Logan and others in concluding that “[i]t is misleading
to label these trends as resegregation,” and do not discuss them
further.386
Why does the trajectory of school segregation differ from that
of residential segregation (which has declined steadily since
1970)? The answer is that residential segregation is just one of
the drivers of school segregation. School segregation also is a
function of three other sets of factors.387 First, the policies that
school districts adopt can have significant integrative or segregative consequences. Measures (often court-imposed) such as adjusting attendance zones, busing students to diverse schools, and
opening magnet schools that draw students of all races, can improve integration. On the other hand, neighborhood schools as
well as school choice policies such as vouchers and charter schools
can worsen racial separation. Second, the configuration of school
384 Whites now make up roughly half of the students in public schools, down from
about 80 percent in the late 1960s. See Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era for Desegregation, 28 Ga St U L Rev 423, 431 (2012). See also Grace Kena, et al, The Condition of Education 2015 *80 (National Center for Educational Statistics, May 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/GJQ5-A6UW (listing past and predicted future school enrollment by race
and ethnicity for 2002, 2012, and 2024).
385 See Gary Orfield, John Kucsera, and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, E Pluribus . . .
Separation: Deepening Double Segregation for More Students *22 (Civil Rights Project,
Sept 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/95XX-Z865 (showing a decline in the share of white
classmates for the typical white student).
386 Logan, Resegregation in American Public Schools? at *1 (cited in note 375). See
also, for example, An and Gamoran, Trends in School Racial Composition in the Era of
Unitary Status at 24 (cited in note 381) (“[O]ne cannot make inferences about school segregation from exposure rates.”); Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd, 8 Am L & Econ Rev at 381
(cited in note 35) (commenting that the isolation index “may have lost much of its meaning
as a measure of racial segregation”). See also Milliken v Bradley, 418 US 717, 747 n 22
(1974) (dismissing the claim that “‘actual desegregation’ could not be accomplished as long
as the number of Negro students was greater than the number of white students”).
387 See Sean F. Reardon and John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating
Schools: The Retreat from School Desegregation in the South, 1990–2000, 81 NC L Rev
1563, 1564–65 (2003) (offering a similar set of explanations for school segregation). Also
importantly, the causality between residential and school segregation runs in both directions. School desegregation orders often cause whites to move out of school districts, thus
increasing residential segregation. See Nathaniel Baum-Snow and Byron F. Lutz, School
Desegregation, School Choice, and Changes in Residential Location Patterns by Race, 101
Am Econ Rev 3019, 3033 (2011). However, this effect is muted when less aggressive desegregative techniques are used, see Rossell and Armor, 24 Am Polit Q at 288 (cited in
note 381), and when school districts encompass most of their metropolitan areas, see
Kendra Bischoff, School District Fragmentation and Racial Residential Segregation:
How Do Boundaries Matter?, 44 Urban Affairs Rev 182, 199 (2008).
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districts themselves can influence metropolitan area segregation.
In particular, the more districts there are in a given area, the
more potential there is for segregation to develop between (rather
than within) districts. And third, the racial profiles of public
schools depend in part on the numbers and identities of students
choosing to attend private schools. Public school segregation can
be affected by exit from the public system.
Of these factors, I focus here on school district policies
adopted either in the wake of litigation or after the attainment of
unitary status. These measures have larger impacts on school
segregation than do school choice policies or private school enrollment.388 These measures also account nicely for the key features
of the post-1960s history of school segregation: a generation of improvement followed by a generation of stagnation.389 And since the
Supreme Court has ruled out interdistrict remedies (including
district consolidation) in almost all cases, these measures are the
only ones that realistically are subject to judicial control.390
Starting with court orders to desegregate, then, they were
issued to about 750 school districts, mostly in the South and
mostly in the late 1960s and 1970s.391 These orders typically required attendance zone adjustment, busing, magnet schools,

388 The consensus in the literature is that school choice policies and private school
enrollment cause small increases in school segregation. White students are more likely to
take advantage of these options, and then more likely to make enrollment decisions that
have segregative consequences. See, for example, An and Gamoran, Trends in School Racial Composition in the Era of Unitary Status at 22 (cited in note 381) (finding that “inclusion of private schools in our analysis does little to change the overall levels of school segregation”); Fiel, 78 Am Sociological Rev at 842–43 (cited in note 375); Meredith P. Richards,
The Gerrymandering of School Attendance Zones and the Segregation of Public Schools: A
Geospatial Analysis, 51 Am Educ Rsrch J 1119, 1120 (2014); Saporito and Sohoni, 79 Sociology of Educ at 94 (cited in note 47) (finding that the black-white dissimilarity index is
slightly higher than expected due to white exit to charter and private schools).
389 See notes 391–403 and accompanying text.
390 See Milliken, 418 US at 745 (holding that an interdistrict remedy is available only
if there has been an interdistrict violation). According to the literature, the consolidation
of school districts substantially improves school segregation (and vice versa). See, for example, Paul M. Ong and Jordan Rickles, The Continued Nexus between School and Residential Segregation, 19 Berkeley Women’s L J 379, 387 (2004) (“Metropolitan areas where
the primary school students are concentrated in a few districts . . . are more likely to have
[low] school segregation levels.”); Sarah J. Reber, Court-Ordered Desegregation: Successes
and Failures Integrating American Schools since Brown versus Board of Education, 40 J
Hum Res 559, 580 (2005) (finding that a larger number of school districts in a metropolitan
area reduces the nonwhite-white exposure index).
391 See Sean F. Reardon, et al, Brown Fades: The End of Court-Ordered School Desegregation and the Resegregation of American Public Schools, 31 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt 876,
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majority-to-minority transfers, or other integrative steps.392
Thousands of additional districts took similar actions on their
own, often in an effort to avoid litigation.393 In a recent study,
Professor Sarah Reber finds that the white-nonwhite dissimilarity index plummeted in school districts that were compelled to
desegregate.394 As displayed in Figure 4, segregation fell by about
20 percentage points in the two years after judicial intervention,
and then maintained these gains for more than a decade.395 Other
studies come to very similar conclusions.396
Next, school districts began attaining unitary status in large
numbers in the 1990s and 2000s, after a trio of Supreme Court
decisions made release from judicial supervision easier to obtain.397 About two-thirds of districts ever subject to desegregation
orders now have been deemed unitary, leaving only about 250 still
required to abide by them.398 Most unitary districts eventually
abandon their integrative policies and revert to neighborhood
schools.399 In a study of all school districts freed from desegregation orders, Professor Reardon and his coauthors show that their
black-white dissimilarity index increased moderately during the

882 (2012) (identifying the 755 school districts that were ever subject to court desegregation orders); Reber, 40 J Hum Res at 561 (cited in note 390) (showing the geography and
timing of court desegregation orders).
392 See Rossell and Armor, 24 Am Polit Q at 278–82 (cited in note 381) (discussing the
prevalence of these techniques over time).
393 See id at 291.
394 See Reber, 40 J Hum Res at 568–69 (cited in note 390).
395 See id.
396 See, for example, Rucker C. Johnson, Long-Run Impacts of School Desegregation
& School Quality on Adult Attainments *11, 15–16 (NBER Working Paper No 16664, Jan
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4D5T-KCBV (using the same analytical design and finding that desegregation orders reduce the black-white dissimilarity index by about 20 percentage points); Rossell and Armor, 24 Am Polit Q at 292 (cited in note 381) (finding a 15
percentage point reduction for the black-white dissimilarity index); Welch and Light, New
Evidence on School Desegregation at *50 (cited in note 381) (finding a 23 percentage point
reduction for the black-white dissimilarity index). See also Logan, Oakley, and Stowell,
113 Am J Sociology at 1631 (cited in note 372) (finding that the metropolitan school dissimilarity index decreased in 1990 and 2000 as the share of children subject to a desegregation order increased).
397 See generally Missouri v Jenkins, 515 US 70 (1995); Freeman v Pitts, 503 US 467
(1992); Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v Dowell, 498 US 237 (1991)
(“Dowell I”). See also Reardon, et al, 31 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 887 (cited in note 391)
(showing dismissals of desegregative orders from 1991 to 2009).
398 See Reardon, et al, 31 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at Appendix Table A1 (cited in
note 391).
399 See id at 899 (noting that evidence supports the view that “most districts adopt
neighborhood-based school assignment policies following the release from court order”).
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fifteen years after release.400 Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 4, segregation rose by about 5 percentage points over this period, or roughly one-quarter of the decrease originally attributable to judicial intervention.401 Again, other studies covering fewer
districts generate almost the same results.402
These findings about desegregation orders and unitary status, in conjunction with the ongoing decline in residential segregation, explain the trajectory of school segregation over the last
half century. Between the late 1960s and the late 1980s, demography and the judiciary operated in tandem. Rising residential
integration pushed schools, slowly but surely, in the same integrative direction. Concurrently, court-ordered remedies cut
school segregation more sharply than the residential trend ever
could. But from the late 1980s to the present, demographic and
judicial forces have worked at cross-purposes. On its own, residential integration would have produced further school integration. This positive influence has been neutralized, though, by the
unitary status that courts have granted to hundreds of school districts. The outcome of these countervailing pressures has been a
draw—stasis where there would have been improvement had the
judiciary stayed its hand.403
That so few school districts remain subject to court supervision (about 250 out of roughly 14,000 nationwide404) also suggests
that residential and school segregation now are tied more tightly
than in the past. When courts in an earlier era insisted on sweeping remedies, they decoupled the link between the two forms of

400

See id at 891–99.
See id at 891–92.
402 See, for example, An and Gamoran, Trends in School Racial Composition in the
Era of Unitary Status at 41–42 (cited in note 381) (finding that unitary status increases
the black-white entropy index by 2 to 6 percentage points); Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd, 8
Am L & Econ Rev at 377 (cited in note 35) (noting a 5 percentage point increase for the
white-nonwhite dissimilarity index); Byron Lutz, The End of Court-Ordered Desegregation, 3 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 130, 145 (2011) (finding a 6 percentage point increase for the
black-white dissimilarity index).
403 For examples of other scholars taking similar positions, see An and Gamoran,
Trends in School Racial Composition in the Era of Unitary Status at 22 (cited in note 381)
(“[H]ad it not been for declarations of unitary status, school segregation would have declined.”); Clotfelter, Vigdor, and Ladd, 8 Am L & Econ Rev at 366 (cited in note 35);
Frankenberg, 45 Educ & Urban Society at 551 (cited in note 36); Reardon and Owens, 40
Ann Rev Sociology at 207 (cited in note 34) (“[T]his decline in residential segregation . . .
offset some of the increasing segregation due to the decline in desegregation efforts.”).
404 See Reardon, et al, 31 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at Appendix Table A1 (cited in
note 391); School Districts (US Census Bureau, June 15, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/42W4-GQBG.
401
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segregation. Schools became integrated even as housing patterns
stayed racially separated. But now that courts largely have left
the stage, and most districts have exploited their departure to return to neighborhood schools, residential segregation should be a
stronger predictor of school segregation. The integrative policies
that dilute its impact mostly are no more.
This hypothesis turns out to be correct. In a multiple regression model of black-white metropolitan area school segregation,
the coefficient for black-white residential segregation jumped
from 0.58 in 1970 to 0.94 in 1990.405 The raw correlation between
these two indices then increased again from 0.70 in 1990 to 0.83
in 2000.406 And as shown in Figure 4, the correlation between
black-white residential segregation (for the under-eighteen population) and black-white school segregation rose once again from
2000 to 2010.407 Residential segregation now accounts for an incredible 91 percent of the variation in school segregation at the
metropolitan area level.408
I address the implications of this strengthening bond at the
end of this Part. In brief, it means that school segregation should
resume declining in the future, even without judicial intervention, as long as residential patterns continue integrating. Below,
though, I turn from empirics to doctrine. I first show how residential segregation historically assisted plaintiffs in school desegregation cases, at both the liability and unitary status stages. I then
argue that residential integration throws a wrench into this area
of law as well.

405 Logan, Oakley, and Stowell, 113 Am J Sociology at 1631 (cited in note 372) (using
the dissimilarity index to measure segregation). Unfortunately, none of the studies that
jointly examine residential and school segregation do so at the school district (as opposed
to metropolitan area) level. How the two measures are related at this level thus is unknown.
406 Erica Frankenberg, Metropolitan Schooling and Housing Integration, 18 J Affordable Housing & Community Dev L 193, 204 (2009) (using the dissimilarity index). Other
studies also have found an increase in the correlation between residential and school segregation during the 1990s. See, for example, An and Gamoran, Trends in School Racial
Composition in the Era of Unitary Status at 36 (cited in note 381) (using the entropy index); Reardon and Yun, 81 NC L Rev at 1590–93 (cited in note 387) (using the entropy
index and analyzing the South only).
407 Frankenberg, 45 Educ & Urban Society at 557–58 (cited in note 36) (using the
dissimilarity index).
408 See id at 558–59.
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FIGURE 4. TRENDS IN, AND CAUSES OF, SCHOOL SEGREGATION409
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A plaintiff’s initial task in a school desegregation case is to
establish segregative intent—to prove that a school district deliberately separated students by race.410 The most direct way that
residential segregation can support an inference of segregative
intent is by helping to produce school segregation, from which an
invidious motive then can be deduced. Residential segregation
409 Logan, Oakley, and Stowell, 113 Am J Sociology at 1627–28 (cited in note 372)
(top-left graph constructed from Logan, Oakley, and Stowell’s data); Stroub and Richards,
50 Am Educ Rsrch J at 510 (cited in note 379) (top-right graph constructed from Stroub
and Richards’s data); Reber, 40 J Hum Res at 569 (cited in note 390) (middle-left graph);
Reardon, et al, 31 J Pol Analysis & Mgmt at 892 (cited in note 391) (middle-right graph);
Frankenberg, 45 Educ & Urban Society at 557 (cited in note 36) (bottom-left graph);
Frankenberg, 45 Educ & Urban Society at 558 (cited in note 36) (bottom-right graph).
410 See, for example, Keyes v School District No 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 US 189, 208
(1973) (noting that “the differentiating factor between de jure segregation and so-called de
facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to segregate”).
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can give rise to school segregation, which in turn can give rise to
liability.411
A 1960s case involving the school system of Manhasset, a
New York City suburb, illustrates this logical sequence. One of
Manhasset’s neighborhoods was over 90 percent black, while the
rest of the town was almost entirely white.412 For decades, the
school district maintained a “rigid neighborhood school policy”413
that resulted in 99 percent of white students attending all-white
schools and all black students attending a school that was 94 percent black.414 “On the facts of this case,” without the district having done anything other than retain its neighborhood school policy, the court found “state imposed segregation.”415
Similarly, Corpus Christi exhibited “substantial residential
concentration by ethnic groups” in the 1970s, with blacks and Hispanics “concentrated in a narrow area.”416 Here too, the school district adhered for decades to a “neighborhood school plan composed
of geographic attendance zones” that yielded stark school segregation.417 And here too, the Fifth Circuit held that the Constitution was violated. “The Board imposed a neighborhood school plan
. . . upon a clear and established pattern of residential segregation in the face of an obvious and inevitable result.”418

411 As throughout the Article, I deal here with the legal implications of de facto, not
de jure, residential segregation. De jure residential segregation can lead to liability even
more directly since, assuming it causes de facto school segregation, segregative intent does
not have to be inferred. An invidious motive is established by the de jure segregation. See
Milliken, 418 US at 755 (Stewart concurring) (noting that “purposeful[ ] racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning laws” can result in liability in school desegregation
cases and justify imposition of interdistrict remedies).
412 See Blocker v Board of Education of Manhasset, New York, 226 F Supp 208, 211
(EDNY 1964).
413 Id at 229.
414 See id at 211–12, 226.
415 Id at 226.
416 Cisneros v Corpus Christi Independent School District, 467 F2d 142, 146 (5th Cir
1972) (en banc).
417 Id. See also id at 145–46 (providing school segregation statistics).
418 Id at 149. For other examples of residential segregation giving rise to school segregation and then to liability, see Hart v Community School Board of Brooklyn, New York
School District #21, 383 F Supp 699, 755 (EDNY 1974) (“We cannot ignore the fact that
the system of geographic school attendance, imposed upon segregated housing patterns,
provides the broad base for racial isolation.”) (quotation marks and brackets omitted);
Bradley v School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia, 338 F Supp 67, 84 (ED Va 1972)
(“School authorities may not constitutionally arrange an attendance zone system which
serves only to reproduce in school facilities the prevalent pattern of housing segregation.”).
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However, cases in which liability follows so closely from residential segregation are unusual.419 This is because school segregation alone, even if caused by segregated housing patterns, typically is not enough to make out a constitutional violation. As one
treatise puts it, “Statistics demonstrating a racial imbalance in
the racial composition of individual schools, by themselves, will
probably not be sufficient” “to prove intentional or purposeful segregation.”420 At this stage, then, the more common role of residential segregation is somewhat more indirect. Rather than leading
at once to culpability, it creates conditions in which school district
policies such as new school construction and attendance zone adjustment can have a segregative effect. Segregative intent then is
inferred from a district’s voluntary decision to adopt these policies.
Examples of residential segregation serving this function
abound, including in the Supreme Court’s case law. In a 1973 decision, the Court dealt with the school system of Denver, one of
whose neighborhoods, Park Hill, was “substantially Negro and
segregated.”421 The school district used “various techniques such
as the manipulation of student attendance zones, schoolsite selection, and a neighborhood school policy” to keep the Park Hill
schools heavily black and the schools in adjoining areas heavily
white.422 In particular, the district built a new school “in the middle of the Negro community,” where many blacks and few whites
would attend it, rather than in a location that would promote integration.423 These actions persuaded the Court that the district
“had engaged in . . . deliberate racial segregation.”424
Likewise, in a 1979 case, the Court confronted the school system of Columbus, whose near-east side was “then and now [a]
black residential area.”425 The school district established “optional
419 Notably, all of the cases of this kind that I have found predate Washington v Davis,
426 US 229 (1976), in which the Supreme Court clarified that the Equal Protection Clause
is violated by discriminatory intent, not discriminatory effect. See id at 238–39. This suggests that Washington, as intended, stopped courts from finding constitutional violations
when the best (or only) evidence of improper purpose was a disparate impact.
420 Ronna Greff Schneider, 1 Education Law: First Amendment, Due Process and Discrimination Litigation § 5:9 at 1032 (Thomson West 2004). See also, for example, Dayton
Board of Education v Brinkman, 433 US 406, 413 (1977) (noting that school segregation
“is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of a showing that this
condition resulted from intentionally segregative actions”).
421 Keyes, 413 US at 260 (Rehnquist dissenting).
422 Id at 191.
423 Id at 192.
424 Id at 198.
425 Columbus Board of Education v Penick, 443 US 449, 506 (1979) (Rehnquist
dissenting).
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attendance zones” that “allowed students in a small, white enclave” in the near-east side “to escape attendance at black
schools.”426 The district also provided for a “group of white students
[to be] bused past their neighborhood school to a ‘whiter’ school.”427
And through “[g]errymandering of boundary lines,” the district ensured that “white residential areas were removed from the black
school’s zone and black students were contained within that
zone.”428 All of these steps had a segregative impact on Columbus’s
schools because of the city’s underlying residential segregation.
And in combination, they led to the Court’s conclusion that the
district was guilty of “intentionally segregative actions.”429
While the liability stage of school desegregation litigation is
important, it has become quite rare in recent years. According to
one study, in only a single case since 1990 has a school district
been found culpable and then ordered to adopt a mandatory student assignment plan.430 Far more frequent now is the unitary
status proceeding, in which a district tries to convince a court that
it should be released from judicial supervision.431 Unitary status
is granted if a district has complied in good faith with a court’s
desegregation order, and if any “vestiges of past discrimination
ha[ve] been eliminated to the extent practicable.”432 “Vestiges” refer to racial imbalances in school enrollment and other areas,433
and are presumed to have been “proximately caused by intentional state action during the prior de jure era.”434
426

Id at 461 n 8 (quotation marks omitted).
Id at 462 n 9.
428 Id at 462 n 10.
429 Penick, 433 US at 463–64. For other examples of residential segregation enabling
school district policies to have a segregative effect, from which segregative intent then is
inferred, see Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 US 1, 7 (1971) (involving “locating schools in Negro residential areas and fixing the size of the schools”);
United States v Texas Education Agency, 564 F2d 162, 171 (5th Cir 1977) (involving “the
construction and abandonment of schools, the selection of school sites, . . . and the drawing
of student attendance zones”).
430 See Lutz, 3 Am Econ J: Econ Pol at 133 (cited in note 402). Of course, multiple
school desegregation suits have been brought in this period. See Holley-Walker, 28 Ga St
U L Rev at 433–42 (cited in note 384) (discussing several such cases).
431 See notes 397–98 and accompanying text.
432 Dowell I, 498 US at 250.
433 See Green v County School Board of New Kent County, 391 US 430, 435 (1968)
(noting that racial imbalances can exist not only in the “composition of student bodies” but
also in “faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities”).
434 United States v Fordice, 505 US 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas concurring). See also
Freeman, 503 US at 505 (Scalia concurring) (describing the “presumption, effectively irrebuttable . . . that any current racial imbalance is the product of that violation, at least if
the imbalance has continuously existed”).
427
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Under this framework, residential segregation often prevents
the achievement of unitary status by reducing the effectiveness of
integrative measures and so fostering school segregation. The
school segregation then is deemed a vestige of the original constitutional violation that has yet to be eliminated. For instance,
Louisville was under a school desegregation order in the 1970s,
and also experienced a rise in residential segregation due to a
“trend [ ] definitely toward ‘white flight.’” 435 The segregative housing trend caused school attendance zones that had been designed
to promote integration to stop working as planned. “[A]s blacks
moved into [each] attendance area, the school would naturally become ‘blacker,’ particularly since whites would ‘flee.’” 436 Many of
Louisville’s schools thus remained racially identifiable, prompting the Sixth Circuit to hold that “[a]ll vestiges of state-imposed
segregation have not been eliminated.”437
Similarly, Dallas was under a school desegregation order in
the 1980s, when it “resemble[d] a pie in which one whole ‘wedge’
is made up of black residents, from the center of the district all
the way to its outermost boundary.”438 This residential segregation, in combination with the city’s geographic sprawl and surging
minority population, undermined all of the integrative policies
the district attempted.439 Attendance zone adjustment produced
only limited improvement in the face of the city’s difficult demography.440 Busing was infeasible due to the city’s traffic and
size.441 And few students took advantage of voluntary majorityto-minority transfers that required them to enroll in schools far
from their homes.442 Thanks to these obstacles, Dallas’s schools
stayed highly segregated443—and thanks to this persistent segregation, the court ruled that “vestiges of the previous segregated
system remain today.”444
435 Newburg Area Council, Inc v Board of Education of Jefferson County, Kentucky,
489 F2d 925, 929 (6th Cir 1973).
436 Id at 928.
437 Id at 929.
438 Tasby v Wright, 520 F Supp 683, 701 (ND Tex 1981).
439 See id at 699–700 (noting the rise of the minority student population from 42 percent in 1970 to 70 percent in 1980).
440 See id at 713–44.
441 See id at 714.
442 See Tasby, 520 F Supp at 748 (“[M]ost minorities would prefer to stay at home
than travel to a far distant school that can still accept transfers of minority students.”).
443 See id at 692–95.
444 Id at 706. For other examples of unitary status being denied in part due to the
impact of residential segregation on school segregation, see Davis v East Baton Rouge
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It is important to note, though, that residential segregation
does not always prevent unitary status from being granted. Especially in more recent cases, it sometimes facilitates school districts’ release from judicial supervision. This is because courts today focus less on the extent of school segregation (which
residential segregation tends to heighten), and more on districts’
responsibility for enrollment imbalances. Residential segregation
is the most powerful force affecting school composition that is not
under districts’ control. So if it is the only reason for continuing
school segregation, then the resulting imbalances are not a vestige of the original constitutional violation. Rather, they are attributable to an independent demographic factor, and the chain
of causality is broken.445
The most famous case of residential segregation helping a
school district achieve unitary status arose in 1992 in DeKalb
County, a suburban area near Atlanta. The county’s school system was placed under a desegregation order in 1969.446 In the ensuing years, “radical demographic changes” took place, causing
the “northern half of DeKalb County [to become] predominantly
white and the southern half [to become] predominantly black.”447
This residential trend, in turn, led to severe school segregation:
“50% of the black students attended schools that were over 90%
black,” while “27% of white students attended schools that were
more than 90% white.”448 The Supreme Court nevertheless held
that the district had earned unitary status. The “population
changes which occurred . . . were not caused by the [district’s] policies,” so the “current racial imbalance” was not a “vestige of the
prior de jure system.”449
Parish School Board, 721 F2d 1425, 1435 (5th Cir 1983) (“The Board’s reliance on housing
patterns as justification for the continued existence of one-race schools is not only factually
but legally unsound.”); Adams v United States, 620 F2d 1277, 1289–90 (8th Cir 1980) (en
banc) (explaining how residential segregation interacted with school district policies to
produce school segregation after the entry of the original desegregation order).
445 See James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern
Desegregation Cases, 81 NC L Rev 1659, 1671 (2003) (“[D]emographic changes that occur
after a court has implemented a desegregation decree can suffice to sever the link between
prior acts of segregation and current levels of racial imbalance.”).
446 See Freeman, 503 US at 477.
447 Id at 475.
448 Id at 476.
449 Id at 494, 496. For other examples of residential segregation helping school districts achieve unitary status, see Pasadena City Board of Education v Spangler, 427 US
424, 436 (1976) (granting unitary status where enrollment imbalances were caused by
“changes in the demographics of Pasadena’s residential patterns” and not by “any segregative actions”); Ross v Houston Independent School District, 699 F2d 218, 219–20 (5th
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The dual role that residential segregation plays at the unitary status stage—helping both to trigger and to rebut the presumption that continuing school segregation stems from the original constitutional violation—distinguishes this area from the
others I have covered. The duality means that, here at least, residential segregation is not an unalloyed advantage for civil rights
plaintiffs. Rather, it benefits them if courts emphasize the resulting enrollment imbalances (as they usually did before the 1990s).
But it weakens plaintiffs’ position if courts stress the causal link
between district policies and school segregation (as they tend to
do today). Fortunately, this complexity does not apply to the doctrinal implications of rising residential integration. As I argue
next, this trend usually assists school districts, at both the liability and unitary status stages.
C.

Complication

Begin with the liability stage. Just as residential segregation
can support an inference of segregative intent more or less directly,
so too can residential integration lead to the opposite conclusion in
more or less straightforward ways. More directly, integrating housing can result in integrating schools, from which an invidious motive is harder to deduce. More circuitously, residential integration
can create conditions in which school district policies that otherwise would have a segregative effect in fact have neutral or integrative consequences. An intent to segregate then cannot be inferred as easily from a district’s adoption of these policies.
Both of these causal pathways were on display in a 1980s
case from Prince George’s County, a suburban region adjoining
Washington, DC.450 The county underwent “widespread and naturally occurring racial integration” during the 1970s, which
caused the “distribution of th[e] minority population [to] become
quite widespread and generalized.”451 The county also reduced its
busing of students and established more neighborhood schools—
steps that could have increased school segregation sharply, but

Cir 1983) (granting unitary status where “the homogeneous student composition of the
schools does not stem from the unconstitutional segregation . . . but from population
changes that have occurred since this litigation commenced”).
450 See generally Vaughns v Board of Education of Prince George’s County, 574 F Supp
1280 (D Md 1983), affd in part, revd in part, 758 F2d 983 (4th Cir 1985).
451 Vaughns, 574 F Supp at 1364–65. See also id at 1319 (noting that the residential
dissimilarity index in the county “dipped from 62 in 1970 to 50 in 1980”).
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did not due to the residential integration.452 Faced with this positive housing trend, as well as potentially segregative policies
whose impact was blunted by the trend, the court could not find
segregative intent. “[P]laintiffs have not met their burden of proving that defendants acted with a racially discriminatory purpose
in implementing the [ ] busing reversals.”453
Likewise, Charles City County, Virginia, was residentially
integrated in the 1960s, when there were “no predominantly
White or Negro areas” and “[p]eople of all of the races reside[d]
throughout the entire county.”454 The county adopted a freedomof-choice plan that allowed each student to select which school to
attend.455 Such plans often failed to achieve meaningful school integration in this era,456 but the county’s succeeded because of its
favorable residential landscape. As the court observed, “freedom
of choice had brought about a considerable amount of school desegregation,” and “every White student in the county presently
attends an integrated school.”457 The court therefore upheld the
plan, adding that it was “leading to the abolition of a system of
segregation.”458
However, residential integration certainly does not preclude
liability. In fact, if a school district enacts policies that manage to
have a segregative effect despite an improvement in housing patterns, it may be easier to infer segregative intent. For example,
“residential segregation in Rockford[, Illinois,] decreased during
the 1970’s and 1980’s.”459 But school segregation rose in the district
due to attendance zone manipulation and “the one-way busing of
minority students.”460 The contrasting housing and enrollment
trends convinced the court that the “clearly predominant cause of
452 See id at 1363 (describing a gap between the predicted rise in school segregation
due to the busing cutback and the rise that actually occurred).
453 Id at 1370.
454 Bowman v County School Board of Charles City County, Virginia, 293 F Supp
1201, 1205 (ED Va 1968).
455 See id at 1203.
456 See Green, 391 US at 440 (“[T]he general experience under ‘freedom of choice’ to
date has been such as to indicate its ineffectiveness as a tool of desegregation.”).
457 Bowman, 293 F Supp at 1204–05.
458 Id at 1206. For another example of residential integration helping to prevent segregative intent from being inferred, see Price v Austin Independent School District, 945
F2d 1307, 1316 (5th Cir 1991) (upholding a ruling in favor of an Austin school district
where there was “ongoing dispersion of Black persons . . . into areas formerly dominated
by majority persons”).
459 People Who Care v Rockford Board of Education, School District # 205, 851 F Supp
905, 1205 (ND Ill 1994).
460 Id.
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segregation in [Rockford] schools was the . . . affirmative segregative conduct by the [district], and not residential segregation.”461
Next consider the unitary status stage. Residential integration typically helps school districts seeking to be released from
judicial supervision because it causes integrative measures to be
more effective and so increases school integration. This improvement then suggests that there remain fewer (or no) vestiges of the
original constitutional violation—and thus that districts can be
trusted to manage their own affairs again. Enrollment statistics
are vital evidence in any unitary status proceeding,462 and residential integration usually makes them more balanced.
For instance, Oklahoma City was under a school desegregation order in the 1990s, and experienced a remarkable drop in
residential segregation during the two prior decades. Its blackwhite dissimilarity index fell from 87 percent in 1972 to 48 percent in 1992.463 Over this period, the school district relied on integrative techniques including “pairing, clustering, and compulsory
busing.”464 Aided by the auspicious housing trend, these techniques led to a sharp decline in school segregation. The blackwhite dissimilarity index for the district’s schools plunged from
78 percent in 1971 to 24 percent in 1984.465 This impressive progress indicated that the district “had eradicated the vestiges of
the dual system and was entitled to have the desegregation decree dissolved.”466
Similarly, Fort Worth was under a school desegregation order
in the 1980s, and underwent the “natural integration of residential neighborhoods” in the 1970s.467 Areas that were “virtually allwhite in 1970” became “more and more integrated according to
1980 census figures.”468 This improvement in housing patterns enhanced the integrative impact of school district policies such as
busing and a “pyramid feeder system.”469 As the court noted, “the
desegregation devi[c]es employed . . . were effective in integrating

461

Id.
See Freeman, 503 US at 474 (“[A] critical beginning point is the degree of racial
imbalance in the school district.”).
463 See Dowell v Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 778 F Supp
1144, 1164 (WD Okla 1991) (“Dowell II”) (citing the projected score for 1992).
464 Id at 1156.
465 See id at 1173.
466 Id at 1148.
467 Flax v Potts, 725 F Supp 322, 329 (ND Tex 1989).
468 Id.
469 Id at 324.
462
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the schools.”470 The court therefore concluded that the district had
“eliminat[ed] all vestiges of discrimination” and was “unitary in
every respect.”471
But just as residential integration does not preclude liability,
it also does not guarantee unitary status. If a school district fails
to adopt integrative measures that take advantage of the favorable housing trend, then its school enrollments may remain racially imbalanced. In turn, these imbalances may be deemed vestiges of the original violation that require continued judicial
supervision. This is precisely what happened to Topeka in the
1980s.472 Its black population “spread widely throughout the eastern part of the city” and also “beg[a]n to move into the western
side.”473 But the district built new schools in areas where they
“promot[ed] racial separation,” designed attendance zones that
“did not further the process of desegregation,” and did not consider more potent remedies such as busing and magnet schools.474
As a result, Topeka’s schools did not integrate to the same extent
as its homes, and the Tenth Circuit held that the district was not
entitled to unitary status.475
Accordingly, residential integration is a contingent rather
than an automatic asset for school districts, at both the liability
and unitary status stages. It does set the stage for integrative policies to make schools markedly less segregated. But districts must
bite the bullet and actually enact these policies. If they are unwilling to do so, their racial imbalances are likely to linger, and
they may be unable to extricate themselves from litigation.
To this proviso, I should add the one I noted earlier in the
FHA and VRA contexts—namely, that cases in which residential
segregation benefits plaintiffs substantially outnumber those in

470

Id.
Flax, 725 F Supp at 330. For other examples of residential integration helping
school districts seeking unitary status, see Reed v Rhodes, 179 F3d 453, 456, 458 (6th Cir
1999) (exempting from further remedial measures “schools in which surrounding neighborhoods were racially integrated”); Davis v School District of the City of Pontiac, 95 F Supp
2d 688, 694, 698 (ED Mich 2000) (granting unitary status where “integration of the schools
was being achieved naturally with the change in the racial composition of the community”).
472 See generally Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 978
F2d 585 (10th Cir 1992) (“Topeka II”); Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee
County, Kansas, 892 F2d 851 (10th Cir 1989) (“Topeka I”), vacd, 503 US 978 (1992).
473 Topeka I, 892 F2d at 856.
474 Id at 867, 885 (quotation marks omitted).
475 See id at 889. See also Topeka II, 978 F2d at 593 (reinstating the Topeka I opinion
after it was vacated by the Supreme Court).
471
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which residential integration aids defendants.476 If anything, this
caveat is even more important here. Unlike residential segregation, school segregation has not declined in recent years, but rather has held roughly constant.477 In addition, few school desegregation suits have been launched in the last generation.478 The set
of cases in which residential integration could make a legal difference thus is doubly small: first, because the improvement in
housing has yet to translate into equivalent progress in enrollments; and second, because the volume of relevant litigation is so
low anyway.
But these are practical rather than conceptual qualifications.
They do not undermine the key points that residential integration
does complicate matters for school desegregation plaintiffs, and
that these difficulties are apt to intensify as the integrative trend
continues. They also do not challenge the statistical picture of
school segregation I painted earlier. Below, then, I discuss the
role that school desegregation law is likely to play in a more residentially integrated America. My outlook is conflicted—optimistic because of the tightening link between residential and school
segregation, but skeptical because of the link’s inherent contingency and its irrelevance to certain racial imbalances.
D. Conciliation
From one angle, the prognosis for school desegregation doctrine is as positive as that for the FHA.479 One of the FHA’s goals
is ending residential segregation. Likewise, the “ultimate end” of
the doctrine is a “nonracial system of public education.”480 Residential segregation has fallen sharply in the last half century. So
has school segregation (though with a lull since the late 1980s),
and it should resume declining in the future now that it is tied so
closely to residential segregation.481 Therefore both the FHA and
school desegregation law are making progress toward the
achievement of one of their core objectives. Cue the celebration.
Adding to the positivity is the fact that residential integration makes voluntary policies to desegregate schools—enacted in
the absence of a court order—more likely to be upheld. For the
476
477
478
479
480
481

See notes 259, 348–49, and accompanying text.
See notes 376–81 and accompanying text.
See note 430 and accompanying text.
See Part II.C.
Green, 391 US at 436.
See Part IV.A.
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sake of brevity, I have not covered the complex case law on the
constitutionality of these measures.482 In brief, though, residential
segregation often necessitates aggressive actions such as assigning students to schools on the basis of race, which are highly suspect under current law.483 In contrast, more modest steps such as
adjusting attendance zones and basing school assignments on
neighborhood (rather than student) characteristics can be quite
effective under integrating conditions.484 These policies usually
have been deemed valid by the courts,485 and if they were adopted
more widely, they would lead to further school desegregation.
There are several flies in this ointment, though. First, even if
school segregation declines at the same rate as residential segregation from this point forward (by no means a certainty), the resulting progress will be frustratingly slow. As noted earlier, the
residential black-nonblack dissimilarity index has fallen by about
5 percentage points per decade since 1970.486 But the typical court
desegregation order in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a 20 percentage point decrease in school segregation within just two
years487—and there were cases of decrees producing as much as an
80 percentage point drop.488 Sitting back and allowing the favorable
housing trend to take its course thus is plainly a less productive

482 For a useful survey, see generally James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 Harv L Rev 131 (2007).
483 See, for example, Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District
No. 1, 551 US 701, 747–48 (2007) (striking down Seattle and Louisville racial assignment
policies).
484 See Erica Frankenberg and Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Public Decisions and Private Choices: Reassessing the School-Housing Segregation Link in the Post-Parents Involved Era, 48 Wake Forest L Rev 397, 422 (2013) (discussing a study concluding that
“geographically based plans would enable [the largest metropolitan school] districts to
make meaningful progress toward integration”); Meredith P. Richards, et al, Achieving
Diversity in the Parents Involved Era: Evidence for Geographic Integration Plans in Metropolitan School Districts, 14 Berkeley J Afr Am L & Pol 65, 71 (2012) (finding that “segregation rates have remained extremely low since [Berkeley] shift[ed] from a race-based
to a geography-based integration plan”).
485 See Parents Involved, 551 US at 789 (Kennedy concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment) (suggesting the validity of policies including “strategic site selection of
new schools” and “drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics
of neighborhoods”); Doe v Lower Merion School District, 665 F3d 524, 557 (3d Cir 2011)
(upholding an attendance zone adjustment aimed at increasing school integration).
486 See Part I.B.
487 See Reber, 40 J Hum Res at 568–69 (cited in note 390).
488 See Welch and Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation at *41 (cited in
note 381) (listing ten school districts where the dissimilarity index fell by between 64
and 81 percentage points after judicial intervention).
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strategy than judicial intervention or voluntary desegregation.
Passivity is likely to produce gains, but only incremental ones.
Second, as I have stressed, the relationship between residential segregation and school segregation is highly contingent on
school district policies. At present, most districts have chosen policies, neighborhood schools in particular, that cause residential
segregation to be an excellent predictor of school segregation.489
But in the future, districts could take actions, such as attendance
zone manipulation, new school construction, and certain school
choice initiatives, that prevent declines in residential segregation
from materializing in school systems.490 True, these measures
could be challenged on the ground that they were adopted with
segregative intent. But lawsuits of this sort seldom have succeeded in recent years.491
And third, racial imbalances in enrollments are not the only
ones that school desegregation doctrine seeks to eliminate. In a
1968 case, the Supreme Court famously held that the doctrine applies “not just to the composition of student bodies” but also to
“every facet of school operations—faculty, staff, transportation,
extracurricular activities, and facilities.”492 These other areas,
however, are largely unrelated to residential patterns. That housing is integrating in a school district does not mean that its teachers are allocated without regard to race, that its minority and
white students have access to the same resources, or that its
schools are equally conducive to learning. Whatever optimism
stems from the residential progress, then, does not extend to aspects of school systems that are mostly impervious to it.
Putting aside these aspects (which are beyond this project’s
scope), how could the law promote more extensive school integration?493 One option, alluded to above, would be to permit all voluntary desegregation policies, including explicitly race-conscious
ones. The more limited measures that courts currently allow are

489 See notes 405–08 and accompanying text (discussing the high and rising correlation between residential and school segregation).
490 See note 388 (summarizing the literature on the segregative effects of school choice
policies).
491 See note 430 and accompanying text.
492 Green, 391 US at 435.
493 In my view, which I note here but do not defend at length, de facto school integration is both an intrinsic good and one that is appealing because of its positive educational
consequences. See Parents Involved, 551 US at 838–45 (Breyer dissenting) (advocating
this position at length).
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helpful, especially in areas where residential patterns are integrating.494 But as Frankenberg and Professor Genevieve SiegelHawley observe, they are “less likely to produce racial integration
than former plans that relied upon race as a single assignment
criteri[on].”495 If these former plans were put back on the table,
they could generate larger gains than their weaker replacements.
Another possibility would be to tighten the connection between school segregation on the one hand and liability and the
maintenance of judicial supervision on the other. If segregative
intent could be inferred more directly from segregated schools,
then plaintiffs would have less difficulty establishing culpability
and compelling school districts to take desegregative actions.496
Similarly, if the presumption that enrollment imbalances result
from the original constitutional violation were strengthened, then
districts’ ability to attain unitary status—and then switch to
neighborhood schools—would be curtailed. The stark reality of racially separated schools again would become the doctrine’s fulcrum.
Of course, both of these suggestions fly in the face of recent
Supreme Court decisions. The Court has rejected overtly raceconscious voluntary desegregation.497 It also has made it progressively easier for school districts to be deemed unitary, even if their
schools (and homes) remain segregated.498 Given current law,
then, the best course of action for proponents of school integration
simply may be to sue more often. Yes, new school desegregation
suits are a rarity these days.499 But unlike unitary status proceedings, the doctrine that applies to them has not been narrowed by
the Court’s recent precedents. Many examples also exist, from
around the country and over several decades, of plaintiffs managing to prove illicit intent even in the absence of formal segregative

494

See note 484 and accompanying text.
Frankenberg and Siegel-Hawley, 48 Wake Forest L Rev at 422 (cited in note 484).
496 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 Harv L Rev 564 (1965) (arguing for this position). The logical endpoint of this argument is that school segregation alone, without any evidence of segregative intent, should be enough to establish liability. See, for example, Keyes, 413 US at 198
(carefully avoiding deciding whether “plaintiffs must prove [ ] only that segregated schooling exists” or “also that it was brought about or maintained by intentional state action”).
And while on the topic of overruling current precedent, school integration at the metropolitan level could be achieved much more easily if Milliken were reversed and courts could
order interdistrict desegregative remedies.
497 See Parents Involved, 551 US at 747–48.
498 See notes 445–49 and accompanying text.
499 See note 430 and accompanying text.
495
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policies.500 And as several commentators have noted, there is no
shortage today of district practices that certainly seem aimed at
keeping students racially separated.501
This is not to say that litigation should be launched willynilly. Especially in minority-heavy urban districts in the Midwest
and Northeast, there may be little that suits can accomplish given
the usual ban on interdistrict remedies.502 But districts in the
South and West tend to encompass both minority-heavy urban
areas and whiter suburban and exurban regions.503 In the Midwest and Northeast too, suburban districts are becoming ever
more diverse.504 There would be a wide array of targets, then, for
a renewed campaign to combat school segregation through the
courts. Such a campaign might lose many of its battles—but the
ones it won likely would produce more integration than any other
tactic.505
CONCLUSION
I have tried to make two contributions in this Article. The
first is to document and then explain the striking decline in residential segregation since 1970. This decline is one of the most important sociological developments of the last half century. But to
date, it has not been noticed by, let alone incorporated into, the

500 Some of these examples were covered in the liability stage discussions in
Parts IV.B–C.
501 See, for example, Nikole Hannah-Jones, Segregation Now (ProPublica, Apr 16,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EFA4-8EAH (describing how “[p]redominantly white
neighborhoods” in Tuscaloosa “have been gerrymandered into the attendance zones of
other, whiter schools”); Sonali Kohli, Modern-Day Segregation in Public Schools (The Atlantic, Nov 18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7VNA-RQ4P (discussing the use of tracking to produce intraschool segregation).
502 See Frankenberg, 18 J Affordable Housing & Community Dev L at 196 (cited in
note 406) (“In the Northeast and Midwest in particular, the differences in racial composition of students across boundary lines have been suggested as a contributing factor to the
high levels of segregation.”).
503 See Sean F. Reardon, John T. Yun, and Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Changing
Structure of School Segregation: Measurement and Evidence of Multiracial MetropolitanArea School Segregation, 1989–1995, 37 Demography 351, 352 (2000) (commenting on
“large urban districts and [ ] countywide districts in parts of the South and the West”).
504 See Clotfelter, After Brown at 80 (cited in note 372) (noting “increases in interracial contact in some suburban school districts”).
505 For hints that this kind of campaign already may be underway, see Holley-Walker,
28 Ga St U L Rev at 424 (cited in note 384) (noting “early indications that traditional
desegregation cases may be in a period of revival”). Of course, the current Supreme Court
is unlikely to be pleased about a resurgence of school desegregation litigation. Lower
courts, though, may be more willing to find segregative intent in appropriate cases.
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law. The second is to explore how three bodies of civil rights doctrine—involving housing discrimination, vote dilution, and school
segregation—are connected to racial groups’ housing patterns.
My central claim is that all three bodies historically have relied
on the existence of residential segregation, and that all three are
unsettled by integration. Their role in a less racially separated
America thus urgently needs to be rethought.
This Article may come too late for some readers, and too soon
for others. Too late because segregation has the ring of a bygone
era, a time when the country paid more heed to, and worked
harder to repair, its racial and spatial divisions.506 And too soon
because our homes and schools, despite the progress they have
made, remain far from integrated. I would prefer to think,
though, that the Article’s timing is quite apt. It is never overdue
to call attention to where people choose to live or enroll their children. It also is hardly premature to reflect on the legal implications of desegregation. The trend is undeniable, it already is disrupting settled doctrine in several areas, and its impact only will
grow in the future. The sooner the law begins to grapple with it,
the better.

506 See Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 Cal L Rev 261, 264 (2006) (“Integration no longer captivates the progressive imagination.”); Drew S. Days III, Rethinking the
Integrative Ideal: Housing, 33 McGeorge L Rev 459, 459 (2002) (“Nobody talks about racial
integration anymore.”).

